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ABSTRACT 
The overall objective of this paper is to empirically examine the influence of Hong 
Kong intermediators on the performance among IJVs formed by Japanese and 
Chinese partners. Drawing upon existing literature, I develop and test a set of 
hypotheses using a data set from Japanese Overseas Investment (Toyo Keizai, 1997). 
Based upon non-parametric of Kruskal-Wallis one-way ANOVA Test and Mann-
Whitney Test, the empirical findings generally do not support the hypotheses in this 
study. The null hypothesis for hypothesis one and two that the three different 
subsidiary types have essentially the same performance is not rejected. Also, in 
hypothesis three a,b and c, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that different IJV 
combination contribute no significant performance difference between non-
metropolitan regions and metropolitan regions. Contrary to previous studies, the 
overall findings indicate that the intermediary function of Hong Kong firms are not 
associated with significant performance difference for subsidiary type and regional 
location among IJVs formed by Japanese and Chinese partners, and are not as 
effective as predicted from previous studies. Thus, three interesting contexts are 
suggested: (1) the Chinese enterprises have some comparative advantages that Hong 
Kong enterprises lack in term of IJVs; (2) the prospects of Hong Kong firm's 
intermediary function become lusterless and Hong Kong firm's intermediaries have 
gradually lost their comparative advantage in handing trade and investment among 
Asian region, particularly in China; (3) environmental factors seem to play a crucial 
role in shaping the performance that beyond the scopes and capabilities of Hong 
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Kong partners. Therefore, it may not be a viable strategy to involve the Hong Kong 
partners in Japanese-Chinese alignment. In addition, the implication and direction for 
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The importance of the Chinese market has been recognized by many foreign 
enterprises. Today, since the adoption of the open door open-up policy in China, it has 
provided foreign firms with the largest market potential in the last decades. With the 
abundant supply of skilled labor, and cheap natural resources, many foreign 
enterprises can produce their products at a lower cost in China. Despite the Asian 
crisis, foreign investors' interest in China remains high. According to the latest 
official figures, in the first half of 1998, 9,196 new foreign companies invested with a 
total ofUS$28.82 billion in China. It was estimated that there were 236,400 foreign-
funded companies across China with a total foreign fund investment of US $770.7 
billion at the end of June, an increase of 2.29% compared to 1997�The promulgation 
of more favorable policies towards foreign investment will further attract more 
foreign enterprises to invest in China. 
Many foreign investors choose a variety of entry modes in China, such as international 
joint ventures (IJV), and licensing and wholly-owned subsidiaries (WOS). Among 
these options, the international joint venture has been the most attractive form of 
foreign direct investment in China during past decades (Davidson, 1987; Pan, 1997; 
Shan, 1991). The formation of IJVs offers substantial economic and political 
advantages towards foreign enterprises, lowering the startup-cost by utilizing the local 
partner's existing infrastructure and facilities (Davidson, 1987), and sharing the 
1 China changes foreign investment policies to attract capital. Zhonghua Gongshcing Shibao (China 
Business Times), September, 14, 1998. 
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investment risks (Beamish & Inkpen, 1995; Davidson, 1987; Pan & Tse, 1996). It is 
argued that the local partner is expected to possess knowledge. In addition, the local 
partner may be in a certain political positions and be able to bargain with government 
policies such as providing more favorable policies and entrepreneurial autonomies 
towards foreign direct investments and allocation (Davidson, 1987; Pan & Tse, 1996). 
Despite the increased popularity of IJV formation, many IJVs in China seem to have 
run into major difficulties. In fact, the number of approved joint venture contracts 
decreased considerably in the period of 1985-1989 (Shenkar, 1990). Many studies 
found that the performance problem has become more and more acute in recent years. 
A survey by Teagarden and Von Glinow (1990) showed that over half of their 
respondents of multinational enterprises (MNE) indicated a greater dissatisfaction 
with the performance of IJVs and tend to minimize or even give up their investments 
in China. This is consistent with the world trend that an IJV is a more problematic 
entry format than a wholly-owned subsidiary or a domestic JV (Inkpen, 1995; Killing, 
1982, 1983; Lake & Lu, 1997). Beamish and Inkpen (1995) argued that the primary 
problems in managing joint ventures stem from one cause: more than one parent. The 
problems are compounded when the parental companies are from different countries. 
As thejoint ventures grow, they may develop a cultural identify which is distinct from 
that ofthe parents, adding to the problem of coordination. Harrigan (1985) suggested 
that partner asymmetries were key IJV problems because they tended to create more 
inter-partnership conflicts and destabilized the venture relationship. Unfortunately, the 
joint venture performance problems are particularly critical in China, complicated 
with disparate cultural and managerial systems between the east and the west 
(Davidson, 1987). 
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Earlier research on the foreign-Chinese joint venture tended to stress the outcome of 
collaborations, the motive for forming joint ventures (Pan & Tse, 1996)，and factors 
affecting the ownership structure (Pan, 1996). Nevertheless, little literature sheds 
light on the solutions to the problems stemming from the fact that JV partners have 
different national and/or corporate backgrounds for the joint venture management in 
China. Even when it is mentioned, it tends to be descriptive and does not adequately 
recognize the problem of partner asymmetries (Geringer & Hebert, 1989; Parkhe, 
1991). One notable exception is the study by Geringer (1991) that suggests that 
matching partners with similar attributes such as cultural distance and managerial 
style in the formation and operation of IJVs will help to shape the overall competitive 
viability. This highlights a critical issue: "symmetry" will enhance the longevity and 
success of an IJV (Geringer, 1991; Parkhe, 1991). For this reason, many foreign firms 
may be interested in aligning a third party which possesses intermediary attributes 
between two different JV partners (Gulati, 1995; Pan, 1996; Shan, 1991; Shenkar, 
1990). In this case, the third-JV party acts as an intermediary organization which may 
greatly lessenAnediate the degree of asymmetries between the JV partners. 
Studies on the three-partners JV arrangement can be best described as scanty. 
Virtually, no studies have empirically examined the function of the "intermediary 
party" in the IJVs in China. The use of "a third party" (Hong Kong) as a local 
conduit/expert to provide professional knowledge for other foreign firms doing 
business in China has been corroborated in many studies (Beamish & Wang, 1989; 
Pan & Tse, 1996). We select a "Hong Kong firm" as the intermediary party in this 
study because Hong Kong firms possess many intermediary attributes such as 
expertise knowledge, a unique geographic position, and cultural and business ties to 
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China, making them ideal partners for cooperative arrangements. This study is the 
first to examine the performance of three-partner IJVs formed by Japanese, Chinese 
and Hong Kong firms. Specially, we propose that the role of the Hong Kong firm is 
to act as an intermediary organization in the foreign-Chinese venture. Such an 
arrangement is advantageous because both firms can complement their strengths with 
each other in the areas of technology, market knowledge and financial assets (Gomes-
Casseres, 1987; Killing, 1983; Lu & Lake, 1997). For example, Sung (1991) strongly 
argues that Hong Kong's free and efficient market structure have played a pivotal role 
in the Chinese economic reform since 1979. Shenkar (1990) suggested that Hong 
Kong firms played central roles in mediating and resolving conflicts between Chinese 
and foreign firms so as to maintain the longevity and performance of the IJVs (Parkhe, 
1991). Beamish and Wang (1989) also proposed that foreign firms should form 
partnerships with Hong Kong firms before entering Chinese markets. Leung and 
Yeung (1993) showed that building up an amicable personal relationship or “guanxi” 
was a key factor to success in China. Because of the geographical proximity of Hong 
Kong to China, Hong Kong managers have accumulated invaluable experience and 
acumen in dealing with both central and local authorities, and have obtained first-
hand information about the long-term policies and the real needs of the country 
(Hsueh &Woo, 1986). In a survey of the attitudes of Japanese enterprises towards 
future investment in Hong Kong, Soham (1995) found that more than 80% of these 
enterprises highly valued the role of Hong Kong as an ideal base for investment in 
China. Specifically, 74% of the Japanese enterprises considered the role of Hong 
Kong firms as their intermediary functions to be promising as regards to future 
economic modernization in China. This finding confirms that Hong Kong firms can 
act as valuable third-party partners in foreign-Chinese JVs because of their expertise, 
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knowledge and connections in China. As Hong Kong firms have actively engaged in 
handling and offering different services, advice and investments for the promotion of 
trade between foreign countries and China, for instance, offering tourism, banking, 
real state, shipping, and business legal consultancy, foreign parties will benefit from 
the mutual trade drive after the establishment of certain forms of cooperative 
relationships with Hong Kong firms prior to approaching Chinese markets. 
The purpose of this paper is to provide insights concerning the role of Hong Kong 
firms within the Japanese-Chinese IJV, and their performance implications. In part 
one ofthe thesis, we first describe major characteristics of contemporary IJV in China 
and briefly review the prior studies of IJV partnership and performance. Section two 
discusses the performance problems faced by foreign-Chinese IJVs in various aspects. 
Section three examines the role of Hong Kong in fostering trade performance 
between Japan and China. The subsequent section discusses the implications of Hong 
Kong firms on the IJV process as the third parties within Chinese-Japanese IJVs. It is 
hoped that upon the completion of the study, the following research questions can be 
answered: (1) How can Hong Kong firms improve the performance of foreign-
Chinese IJVs; (2) What will be the performance consequence of the foreign-Hong-
Kong-Chinese JV as compared with the foreign-Chinese IJV alone. Two terms 
"Japanese-Chinese IJVs" and "Sino-Japanese IJVs", are interchangeably used 
throughout the thesis, referring to "international joint ventures formed by one or more 




The conceptual foundation for the hypotheses developed rests on an understanding of 
the role of a third IJV party, a "Hong Kong firm" in an IJV between a Japanese and a 
Chinese firm, and its influence on the IJV performance. The literature review is 
divided into four parts. In the first part, we discuss the contemporary IJVs partnership 
in China. Next, we define the IJVs partnership and performance; then we review the 
relationship between partnership and performance. In the third part, we examine the 
performance problems faced by Japanese-Chinese IJVs partnership, ]n the final part, 
we discuss how Hong Kong firms can influence the performance of the Japanese-
Chinese IJV partnership. After a general discussion of these topics, a set of 
hypotheses will be established. 
Contemporary IJVs in China 
During the 20 year of adoption of the "open-door policy" of economic reform in 
China, China has become the most prosperous and energetic market for most foreign 
companies. With the promulgation of more laws and regulations and favorable 
priorities on foreign direct investment by the Chinese government, it has undoubtedly 
attracted substantial foreign investment. Many foreign firms are eager to take part in 
what they see as the largest business opportunity (Leung & Yeung, 1995; Shenkar, 
1990). 
Despite China encouraging foreign investment and technology transfer in 
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infrastructure and other leading industries such as petrochemicals, the Chinese 
government imposes stringent controls on the market operation in China (Pan & Tse, 
1996). Under these circumstances, many local companies have opted to use JV 
formats as the major mode of operation. There are many incentives to set up joint 
ventures such as risk sharing, lower startup costs and greater revenues (Davidson, 
1987; Pan & Tse, 1996). In 1993，the number of approved equityjoint ventures with 
foreign partners was 12,000 in addition to more than 8,000 contractual joint ventures. 
The total contract value of these ventures exceeded US$ 30 billion (see Table 1). 
Of course, the opening up of the vast market has created many opportunities, and also 
many problems for foreign enterprises. Because of the unique political, economic and 
cultural environment in China that is very different from that in westem countries 
(Ralston, Gustafson, Cheung & Terpstra, 1992; Shenkar, 1990), these special 
characteristics make IJVs more problematic to manage than other modes of operation 
in China (keland, 1991)] 
As a result, there are high overall performance problems among IJVs in China, which 
are very costly for the parental companies (Beamish, 1993; Davidson, 1987; Ireland, 
1991; Shenkar, 1990). These IJVs problems are not unique to those under Chinese 
control, but rather universal (Shenkar, 1990). Previous studies show that most of the 
IJVs problems can be attributed to two primary factors: multiple national affiliation 
and multiple ownership (Shenkar & Zeira, 1987). Multiple national affiliation means 
that IJVs are formed by alignment of parent companies which are anchored in 
1 Foreigners in China are not alike: Profit vary according to ownership. Zhongguo Shuiwu Bao (China 
Tax News),OzXohQT, 1，1998. 
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environments differentiated by culture and political, economic and legal systems. 
Multiple ownership means that IJVs are owned, and often managed, by at least two 
parent firms (in China, one of those is always a host firm). 
Table 1 
The Amount of Foreign Direct Investment against the Number 
ofContracts Signed from 1979 to 1990 
Number of Contracted Utilized amount 
contract signed amount (US$ billion) 
(US$ billion) 
Direct investment 21,734 33.80 14.91 
(1979-89) which: 
Joint ventures 12,191 12.55 ^ 
Cooperative enterprises 8,018 18.08 7 ^ 
Wholly foreign-owned 1525 3.17 0.66 
enterprises 
Direct investment (1988) 5,945 ^ ^ 
Direct investment (1989) 5,779 5 ^ 3 ^ 
Direct investment 2 784 2 40 1 2 
(1990-the first six months) ‘ ‘ “ 
Direct investment 24,518 36.20 16.11 
(1979-mid-1990) 
Source: Canada China Trade Council Newsletter, April 1989; September, 1990 
According to Beamish (1993), overall joint venture instability in China is high due to 
the complicated bureaucracy structure in Chinese enterprises. Therefore, many 
foreign firms have already lost patience and confidence with the PRC partners since 
decisions are made via multiple review. These IJVs problems are more acute in small 
business enterprises (Leung & Yeung, 1995). One of the solutions is to understand 
Chinese history, culture and customs in building up a good cross-cultural relationship 
and behave in an acceptable manner in the Chinese context. However, many foreign 
managers tend to act in ways which reflect their own cultural norms and practices 
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(Ralston, Gustafson, Cheung & Terpstm, 1992; Tse, Francis & Walls, 1994). These 
behavioral practices are particularly hard to be accepted particularly in the Chinese 
workplace. 
Prior analysis of IJV Partnership and Performance 
Definition of JVs Partnership 
The definition of JY partnership varies among the studies of IJVs. Most research in 
international business has focused exclusively on the cooperative ventures between 
one foreign firm and one host country (local) firm, and few studies have explicitly 
focused on non-conventional JV partnerships such as (1) JVs formed by multiple 
partners; and (2) JVs formed by non-local firms. In this study, I focus not only on the 
conventional foreign (Japanese)-local (Chinese) two partner JVs, but also on three-
partner JVs formed by foreign (Japanese), local (Chinese) and third country based 
partners (Hong Kong). The "JV partnership" usually refers to the collaborative 
projects implemented by firms operating in the same industry (Dussauge & Garrette, 
1995). In this study, I adopt a broader definition of JV partnership, following Parkhe 
(1991). Parkhe (1991) defined IJV partnerships as "relatively enduring interfirm 
cooperative arrangements, involving cross-border flows and linkages that utilize 
resource/or governance structure from autonomous organizations headquartered in 
two or more countries, for the joint accomplishment of individual goals linked to the 
corporate mission of each sponsoring firm". This definition delineates IJV from 
single-transaction market relationships as well as from unrelated diversification 




Configuration of performance has been a controversial topic in JV literature 
(Geringer & Herbet, 1989; Yan & Gmy, 1994). Defining and measuring the 
performance of IJVs have been complex tasks for many researchers. Efforts to 
identify the appropriate definition and measurement of performance have been 
constrained by continued disagreements regarding the comparability and reliability of 
alternative performance measures, and the methodology for collecting such data 
(Geringer 8c Hebert, 1989). The literature on joint venture performance reveals 
several areas of inconsistencies: (1) variation in performance measures, such as 
financial indicators profitability, growth and cost production; (2) getting the 
subjective measure of respondents，either from single or multiple subjects; and (3) 
variation in the appropriateness of different national culture measures as a venture 
matures (Geringer 8c Hebert, 1989; Yan & Gray, 1994). These controversies derive 
from performance evaluation that makes cross-study comparison and generalizations 
aboutjoint venture performance particularly problematic. 
Relationship between partnership and performance 
Researches on partnership and performance have been mentioned in many studies. In 
a large sample study, Harrigan (1988) examined the influence of partner asymmetries 
on joint venture success. Performance was measured on the basis ofjoint venture 
duration, survival and the manager's assessment of the satisfaction of the IJV 
operation. The result of this study showed that alliances between similar firms tend to 
be more successful in the achievement of superior performance than asymmetric 
relationships. Li a study of international joint ventures between developed country 
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partners, Killing (1982,1983) compared thejoint ventures in which one partner had a 
dominant position with those JVs in which both partners had an equal ownership. He 
concluded thatjoint ventures with dominant partners were more successful than those 
with balanced partnership. He argued that dominant partners could reduce the 
dissatisfaction over allocation of resources and hence minimize the conflict in 
interorganizational relationships. Beamish (1984) examined those joint ventures set 
up by multinational companies in less-developed countries. He found that 
performance was favorable either to JVs with shared or local dominant control. The 
performance was measured subjectively on the basis of manager opinions. Makino 
and Beamish (1996) argued that when JVs were made up of two or more firms that 
had different sets of resources, values and interest, the managerial complexity of 
coordinating interflrm diversifies substantially increased. This implied that similar 
partnership attributes could effectively reduce the managerial complexity. Previous 
studies also corroborated that the level of managerial complexity was lower either 
when firms formed JVs with similar sets of resources and organizational 
characteristics, or when they possessed the dominant share of JV ownership 
(Anderson 8c Gatignon, 1986; Brown, Rugaman & Verbeke, 1989; Geringer & 
Woodcock, 1989). 
In conclusion, previous studies have suggested that certain types of JV partnership 
will influence performance of IJVs. One consequence suggested by previous studies 
is the failure to commit resources towards the IJV operation (Cullen, Johnson 8c 
Sakano, 1995; Madhok, 1995; Makino & Beamish, 1996) would cause many 
performance problems. This is evidenced by the recent trend of Japanese investment 
in China. 
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Japanese Investment in China 
The volume of trade between Japan and China has increased dramatically in recent 
years. Since the early 80s, many Japanese companies have established many 
businesses in China. By 1993, the bilateral trade had grown by 31 % to $37.8 billion 
US. dollars, and Japan had become the second largest trading partner with China after 
Hong Kong. In the first half of 1993, Japanese investment contracts grew by 153%, as 
compared with the same period in 1992 fNeff, 1994), and the number of the total 
signed Japanese-Chinese IJVs in every province increased steadily from 1986 to 1995 
(see Table 2). In spite of the increased trade volume between the two countries, the 
total volume of Japanese direct investment in China was still behind that of Hong 
Kong and the USA. Sohma (1995) found that only 46 % of Japanese managers felt 
optimistic towards future investment. The majorities were skeptical about the new 
setting-up ofnew business transactions in China due to its unstable political situation 
and less sophisticated managerial systems. Also, he observed that about 50 % of the 
Japanese managers were concerned about the economic uncertainty in China, and 
10% even expressed a negative views regarding their future investment plans. With 
respect to ownership position, there was a strong indication that more Japanese 
partners preferred a majority ownership position than did US partners; i.e., 55.2% of 
Japanese, compared with 44.4 % of US partners owned 50% or more equity share 
(see Table 3). With respect to foreign capital contribution, Table 4 shows that 40% of 
Japanese firms contributed less than half a million dollars compared to 32.3 % ofUS 
partners in the same category and 27.6 % of Japanese partners had contributed their 
investments ranging from one to five millions dollars compared with 36.5 % ofUS 




Location of Japanese-Chinese International Joint Venture (IJV) in China 
Chinese Total Before 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
province 1986 
China 1883 “ 99 28 — 5434 ~54 41 一 87 —144 280 372 —448 
Beijing 230 “ 28 10 — 7 ~7 6 一 10 ~24 _ _ _ _ _ 2 g _ _ ^ 2 _ ^ 9 _ 
TianJin 114 —11 4 4 ~ 4 一 2 5 — 15 21 28 
Shanghai 404 “ 9 4 — 10 ~7 10 — 18 ~29 75 91 —102 
Hebei 38 — 1 - “ - —- - 一 3 2 — ~ 4 8 U~ 
Shanxi 3 - - - - - - ~2 - i I 
Neimen- 6 - - 1 - - - 1 ~ 3 1 
_ggH 
Lianoing 213 8 2 11 13 3 19 20 32 34 38 
JilIian 11 - - - - 1 - i ~ \ 3 2 
Heilong- 10 1 - 1 - - 1 “ 2 3 1 
jiang 
Jiangsu 240 9 1 3 8 4 4 16 43 52 71 
Zhejiang 81 2 1 3 3 1 ~ 1 ~ 7 “ 9 26— 18 
Anhui 10 - - - - - 1 i —- 3 3 
Fujian 41 4 2 4 1 3 3 3 5 7 7 
Jiangxi 1 - - - - - - _ \ _ _ 
Shandong 112 4 1 4 1 3 ~ 3 ~ 12 16 ~~l9 30 “ 
Henan 17 - - 2 - 1 - ~ \ 2 9 
Hubei 14 - - - - - 1 1 ""4 2 5 
Hunan 10 _ 1 - - - 2 —- \ I 5 
Guang- 249 ““p7 1 U 9 4 9^ U 32 Ji 4 ^ 
dong 
Guangxi 6 1 - - - - - 1 . 2 1 
Hainan 7 - - 1 - - - ~2 I 3 I 
Sichuan 38 2 - - 1 1 - j 7 4 11 ~ 
Guizhou 1 - _ _ - - - ~ I I J 
WanNam - - - - - - - ~ I I I 
Tibet "- - 一 - ~ - - ~ ： ： ： ： 
Shanxi 21 2 - 1 - - _ 1 ~^ 4 5 
Jianshu - - - - - - _ . _ ““I I 
Ningxia 1 - - - - - - ~ I I I 
Xinjiang 4 - 1 - - _ - —- J j I 
Unknown 1 - - - - - - - ~ I I 
Province 
HongKong 1131 “ 495 64 60 ~69 55 — 42 65 72 “ 84 7 ~ 
Taiwan 817 “ 350 89 — 75 —70 60 — 33 30 30 “ 15 ~ " " 3 ^ 
Total 3831 944 181 199 193 156 162 228 382 ~ 7 1 556 
Source: Toyo Keizai (1997) 
Evidently, two implications can be drawn: first, Japanese firms are reluctant to invest 
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a vast amount of capital in China; second, Japanese partners prefer a dominant equity 
position in China. This begs the question: Why do Japanese partners have such 
attitudes towards their investments in China ？ One possible answer is that Japanese 
firms are generally less committed to theirjoint ventures in China, and hence avoid 
large resource investment in China. Parkhe (1991) argued that similarities in cultural 
characteristics among IJV partners would reduce the necessity of mutual adjustment 
for interfirm cooperation and hence enhance the survival and longevity of the IJV. 
Harrigan (1988) argued that an IJV formed by two partners with similar cultures, 
asset size, strategic mission, resource capabilities, and managerial styles would last 
longer and attain more successful performance than those formed by partners with 
different cultures. Killing (1983) also suggested that management of an IJV would be 
easier if it was formed by firms with similar cultural backgrounds. 
However, Madhok (1995) argued that IJV partners would have different potential to 
build up trust in the IJV, and suggested that the relationship between cultural 
similarities among IJV partners, and IJV performance might be moderated by the 
state of the tmst relationship between the partners. He argued that some firms with 
certain firm-specific organizational attributes would be more capable of nurturing 
trust relationship than others. He further suggested that certain interfirm coordination 
mechanisms such as a long-term cooperative relationship would moderate the chance 
of opportunistic behaviors among partners. The majority of previous studies also 
tended to share the idea that national culture did matter for the individual's attitude 
towards trust building and the firm's choice of ownership levels. For example, many 
studies suggested that Japanese firms had a higher propensity to tmst their local IJV 
partners than non-Japanese firms when Japanese management styles and practices 
15 
were successfully transferred to the IJV of the host country (Beechler & Yang, 1994; 
Cullen, Johnson & Sakano, 1995; Makino & Beamisli, 1996). For these reasons, 
Japanese firms prefer to search for partners compatible with their management styles 
and practices. For example, Makino and Beamish (1996) suggested that many 
Japanese firms often preferred to form an IJV with another Japanese firm as the first 
priority of partnership. Li summary, similar culture or comparable management 
practices will promote interpartner communication and commitment between partners, 
resulting in enhancement of coordination and favorable outcome in the IJV 
(Anderson & Weitz, 1989). Previous research also indicates that the willingness of 
foreign (especially Japanese) firms to commit investment to a foreign market is 
inversely related to the perceived uncertainty of doing business in that country 
(Davidson & McFetridge, 1985; Pan, 1996; Shan, 1991). When the level of risk 
associated with the invested location goes up, foreign investors will invest and 
commit tremendous resources towards IJVs in this environment with great reluctance 
(Pan, 1996). 
IJVs problem in China: A Global Prospective 
Previous studies suggested partner symmetry would significantly determinate JV 
performance. Therefore, I focus on the impact of the partnership symmetry between 
IJV partners on the IJV performance. There are several factors that influence partner 
symmetry, both internal and external. Internal factors include: (1) cultural differences; 
(2) language barrier; (3) incompatible cross-cultural negotiation practice; and (4) 
incompatible management style. External factors include: (1) foreign exchange 
shortage of IJV; (2) lack of strong technology base of local partners; and (3) 
inadequate infrastructure support. This review is the first step towards a 
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comprehensive understanding of what performance problems foreign-Chinese IJV are 
likely to face in China. 
Table 3 
Foreign Equity Ownership among Japan, USA and Hong Kong in China 
Foreign Foreignequityshard 1979-84 1985-87 1988-90 1991-93 “Totals 
partner 
Japan <50% 45.8% 42.2% 48.2% 41.2% 4 4 . 8 % ~ 
=50% 41.7% 50.0% 28.1% 20.0% 34.3% 
>50% 12.5% 7.6% 23.7% 38.8% 20.9% 
USA <50% 53.3% 47.1% 61.3% 55.7% 5 5 . 6 % ~ ~ 
=50% 36.7% 40.8% 19.0% 13.7% 24.4% 
>50% 10.0% 12.2% 19.7% 30.6% 20.0% 
Hong <50% 67.6% 68.8% 64,2% 60.0% 64.5% 
Kong =50% 24.7% 20.8% 20.8% 10.8% 15.9% 
>50% 1.1% lO.40/o 10.4% 29.2% 19.6% 
Source: Pan (1997) 
Table 4 
Foreign Capital Contribution among Japan, USA and Hong Kong in China 
Foreign Capital contribution """^1979-84 1985-87 ~""1988-90 """1991-93 ~ ~ T o t a l s ~ " 
partner 
Japan Less than 0.5 million 33.3% 59.4% 46.0% 7.5% 40.0% 
Between 0.5 and 1 25.0% 17.0% 28.8% 16.3% 22.3% 
Between 1 and 5 35.4% 21.7% 20.9% 42.5% 27.6% 
More than 5 million 6.3% 1.9% 4.3% 33.8% 10.2% 
USA Less than 0.5 million 28.3% 35.7% 45.9% 12.0% 32.3% 
Between 0.5 and 1 23.3% 23.6% 26.5% 11.5% 21.3% 
Between 1 and 5 43.3% 31.2% 22.9% 57.4% 36.5% 
More than 5 million 5.Q% 9.6% ^ 19.1% 10.0% 
Hong Less than 0.5 million 50.2% 70.4% 23.6% 5.6% 34.2% 
Kong Between 0.5 and 1 51.6% 15.5% 33.0% 12.1% 19.7% 
Between 1 and 5 52.8% 13.0% 38.1% 54.7% 34.2% 
|More than 5 million 6.4% 1.1% 5.4% 27.7% 11.9% 
Source: Pan (1997) 
Cultural Differences 
Cultural differences inevitably hinders the smooth functioning of joint ventures. 
Although cultural differences alone may not provide cultural similarities or 
differences among the partners may substantially influence a sole explanation for JV 
performance, the performance of UV partnership. In this study we use Hofstede's 
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conceptualization of national culture so that the cultural differences can be quantified 
and measured, allowing us to perform a quantitative assessment of the degree to 
which Japan and China differ in their cultural characters. According to Hofstede 
(1980), culture is defined as a leamed set of norms for beliefs and social behaviors 
that are shared by group members. There are four cultural dimensions, namely, power 
distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism, and muscularity. Power distance 
represents the extent to which the unequal power distribution in an organization is 
accepted in a society; uncertainty avoidance represents the degree of tolerance for 
uncertainty in a society; individualism represents the extent to which individuals 
consider themselves more important than the collective; and muscularity represents 
the extent to which assertiveness, the acquisition of money and things, and a lack of 
concern for others are the dominant values in a society. 
In every dimension of Hofstede's measures, the cultural distances between China and 
Japan is quite large. For instance, power distance index (PDI) is 36(90-54); 
individualism scale (IDS) is 26(20-46); muscularity scale (MAS) is 29(66-95); and 
uncertainty avoidance index (UAI) is 63 (29-92). Several authors have shown that 
different national cultures embody different attitudes, values and beliefs from their 
business cultures, styles, and practices (Hofstede, 1980; Parkhe, 1991; Schneider, 
1988). For example, Ouchi (1981) examined and concluded that they were the USA 
and Japanese cultures mostly incompatible. He concluded that the presence of 
dissimilarities between parent firms' national cultures might be more likely to lead to 
differences in parent firms' objectives for IJV formation, as well as in their 
approaches to coordination, operating methods and strategy implementation (Geringer, 
1988; Root, 1982; Sullivan & Peterson, 1982). 
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As culture is thought to influence the ways of perceiving, thinking, feeling and 
evaluating, it is expected that these dissimilarities may also lead to differences in the 
partners' perceptions of the other partner (Schneider, 1989). Lai and Lam (1986) 
suggested that foreign expatiate managers tend to behave in ways that reflect their 
culture, especially when making difficult or complex decisions. In international 
business relations，mangers frequently utilize their learned experience to overcome 
uncertain situations in the host countries, without direct links or dialogue with their 
IJV partners. Such managerial practices may not be well suited in some developing 
countries, resulting in performance problems regarding IJV partnership. Although 
cultural difference is not a direct source of conflict in many international joint 
ventures, it is theoretically a critical factor and can have a negative impact on 
international joint ventures. If these principles are applied to a Japanese-Chinese joint 
venture, we will expect that Japanese firms will lower their commitments when there 
are obvious sources of potential conflicts between IJV partners. 
Language Barrier 
An English person who doesn't know French would also have no idea in France. 
Similarly, a foreigner does not have the slightest clue on what is being said or written 
in China. Familiarity with the Chinese language is a prerequisite to understanding the 
Chinese environment. This is particular difficulty for foreign firms in negotiations 
because negotiation usually involves verbal communication with the local authorities 
(Stone, 1995; Tung, 1986). Unfortunately, the number of foreign executives familiar 
with both English and Chinese as well as business knowledge is still limited. This is a 
major constraint for doing business in China (Ireland, 1991; Leung & Yeung, 1995). 
As a consequence, most executives must totally depend on a interpreter for every 
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transaction agreement. In addition, the skills of interpreters may vary considerately 
(Ireland, 1991). Davidson (1987) points out that it is a significant problem to recmit a 
good interpreter in China. Fisher (1980) suggested that insufficient attention was paid 
to the role of the interpreter and translator in international business negotiations. The 
evidence suggested that "negotiators typically treat the problems of translation and 
interpretations problems too naively and prosaically" (Fisher, 1980). Without 
competent human resources, many foreign firms are unable to manage all the 
stakeholder relationships represented by various local authorities. 
Cross Cultural Negotiation Style 
Aside from the linguistic difficulty, the adjustment to Chinese customs and lifestyle is 
quite difficult due to different cultural norms and values between the east and the west. 
Negotiating an IJV agreement in China is a long and arduous process, which is further 
complicated by cultural, legal and bureaucratic factors (De Pauw, 1981; Pye, 1982; 
Tung, 1982). If foreign negotiators understand Chinese negotiation tactics, however, 
fruitful results will follow. 
China is in the process of modernization, and has attempted to reform its large-scale 
industrial enterprises to adapt to the environmental changes. These changes include: 
increased entrepreneurial autonomy in terms of executive authority, the rise in number 
of private and rural enterprises, the promulgation of more favorable polices towards 
foreign direct investment, and, greater involvement in the international market 
(Economist, 1991:18)? However, the structure of decision-making process in Chinese 
2 Shanghai Baosteel Group formed-Largest steel company in China. Gucmgming Ribao, (Guangming 
Daily), November, 18, 1998. 
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enterprises is still hierarchically-minded and governed by a loop of authorities and 
bureaucracies.^ All the settlements must be heavily screened through a series of Chinese 
officials (Stewarts 8c Keown，1989). Even for the involvement of simple tasks during 
the negotiation process, much time is spent for review and concurrence. Typically, an 
agreement is made after around two to four years ofnegotiation. 
Management Style 
There is much difference between western and Chinese approaches to negotiation. 
Unlike the West, where the mles and agreement of commercial transactions are 
strictly stipulated in legal contracts, in China, it has been traditional to subsume the 
business relationship under the "moralistic notion of friendship" (Fisher, 1980). In 
many cases, Chinese negotiators will regard written contract as being less important 
than face and personal connections and will not treat a contract as the final agreement 
(Breth & Jin, 1991). Without understanding the Chinese negotiation style, foreign 
firms cannot negotiate greater privilege from Chinese parties during among foreign-
Chinese IJVs' agreement. 
Running an enterprise in China often comes down to the ability of foreign partners in 
managing the relationship among various partners (Roehrig, 1994). Child and Lu 
(1990) point out that the officials in the local industrial bureaus possess the authority 
to approve contracts specifying enterprise agreements. Xin and Pearce (1996) suggest 
that many firms in China seek the assistance firom the related top echelon who 
possesses greater executive power to authorize the real decision. However, the amount 
3 Shanghai launches investment campaign to sustain industrial growth. Jiefang Ribao (Liberation 
Daily), October, 28,1998. 
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of assistance that foreign firms can get from a top Chinese official depends on how 
many "personal connections" they have cultivated in the past. Once a "relationship" is 
successfully built up, the project can go ahead within a short interval (Stone, 1995). 
Such "personal connections" seem to be particularly important in private Chinese 
companies, especially in an unreliable legal and regulatory environment (Greene, 
1991; Xin & Pearce，1996; Yeung & Leung, 1995). 
Ireland (1991) argued that guanxi (personal relationship) was very useful in 
overcoming the bureaucratic hurdles in China. In a survey on 150 Hong Kong firms, 
Leung and Wong (1993) revealed that a "personal relationship" or “guanxf, was of 
paramount importance when a firm participated in trade with China. Root (1982) 
investigated the personal trust in forty large Chinese companies, and found that 
personal tmst is a first principle in recruitment and selection criteria, especially when 
recruiting senior executives. In order to sustain the tmst and commitment relationship, 
cultivation of personal relationships or “guamf, with Chinese authority was a 
prerequisite in China. Xin and Pearce (1996) described the advantage of‘‘guami” as 
follows: 
If guanxi is more important to managers with great need for a 
substitute for formal structural support, this importance should be 
reflected in the ways these managers characterize their relationships. 
In particular, we will expect such a substitution to be reflected in 
greater reliance on connections as a defense against threats, a greater 
reliance on connections in government, and reports of deeper and 
closer connections on the part of private executives. Those who rely 
on their business connections as a substitute for a stable rule of law 
would also be expected to see them as primary defensive. That is, 
rather than reporting the usefulness of connections in obtaining 
customers, market information or securing credit, as managers in 
stable developed-market economics might, managers in less 
developed countries may report needing connections to help them 
face fundamental threats, such as expropriation and extortion fNee, 
1992; Redding, 1990; Yang, 1994). 
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For foreign firms that form IJVs with a Chinese partner, the local partner's guanxi 
seems to be extremely important, since newly formed IJVs are weak in financial status 
and vulnerable to external threats such as extortion by local governments. Moreover, 
the committed resources by two parents may not entirely cover the UV's daily 
expenses since there are a number of subtle or hidden costs that cannot be foreseen 
exactly in the investment plan. The drives the IJV to search for other necessary funds 
or revenues to make up the balance. One solution is either to increase productivity or 
to seek loans from local financial institutions. “Guanxi,, is important when the latter 
option has to be chosen. 
Government Policies 
In China, the state-owned companies dominate a number of industries. For instance, 
the home electronic and appliance market is controlled by a few big state-owned 
companies that enjoy enormous government support in areas such as finance and 
regulation control markets. Because this market is huge and diverse, massive 
investment is needed to create economies of scale. Under such circumstance, it is 
difficult, especially for those newly formed IJVs, to compete with the state-owned 
companies, that are usually small in scale and lack financial capital during the 
"startup" period (Fang, 1998). 
Development of the competitive advantages often poses extra financial burdens on 
these newly-formed IJVs. Under the unfavorable environment, they have to seek loans 
from local institutions. Although they are mostly financially backed up by their 
Chinese parent companies, unless the Chinese government is involved in the 
borrowing process, the IJVs receive few loans from local banks because the local 
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partners' creditabilities are weak and insecure (Fang, 1998; Sung, 1991). Xin and 
Pearce (1996) advocated that executives should build their business connections with 
government officials who could ensure continuous access to essential resources. Thus, 
it is vital for foreign managers to maintain amicable “guanxf, in defense against 
external influence on the IJV. 
One way to cultivate good connections is to make frequent interactions with different 
parties. However, building up “guanxf, is particularly difficult task for those who are 
ethnically non-Chinese because of communication barriers and unfamiliarity with 
Chinese customs and lifestyle. In addition, for cultural and financial reasons, the 
Chinese are still very wary of foreign parties (Ireland, 1991; Shenkar, 1990; Tung, 
1986). In these circumstances of mistrust, foreign investors may not contribute their 
critical resources to the IJVs, resulting in a greater likelihood of JV instability. 
Disparate Management Style between Foreign-Chinese IJVs Partnership 
Previous studies point out that the effectiveness of a particular managerial behavior is 
a function of the cultural influence. The basic logic is that because managerial 
attitudes and values differ from one culture to another, so do effective managerial 
behaviors (Farmer & Berry, 1975). If this principle holds tme in China, one empirical 
question will arise: "Do similar problems emerge as expatiate managerial attitudes 
and values vary significantly in China compared with their home countries?" We now 
can start to examine the characteristics of expatriate managerial style in China. 
As the process of modernization proceeds at a fast pace in China, it has reformed its 
large-scale industrial enterprises and fostered trade efficiency particularly with exports. 
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At micro-level, the reform aims at enhancing flexibility and efficiency ofbasic trading 
units via increased entrepreneurial autonomy, and offers more material incentives to 
the international markets for export-orientated activity (Siu & Darby, 1997). This 
change has created immediate pressures for many foreign-Chinese joint ventures to 
attain good profitability. As the scope of the self-responsibility for profits or loses is 
more emphasized, both partners seek more autonomy to formalize their preferred 
management procedures independently, usually without mutual consensus. While 
many mangers still engage in their own managerial practices reflected in their own 
countries, they often fail to recognize that those procedures are sometimes ill-suited in 
China. Under the diverse managerial systems between foreign and Chinese firms, 
Chinese workers may feel a sense of insecurity within the IJVs since they don't know 
which workforce procedure they should follow. For instance, the critical managerial 
difference between two partners is caused by the variation in cultural interpretations 
on the role of communication in business. Usually, oral communication serves as the 
most efficient way of many foreign managers to convey messages. Mintzberg (1979) 
found that managers usually spent a vast amount of time on oral communication. In an 
uncertain environment, verbal communication between interdependent units is 
essential. At the management level, however, many foreign mangers find verbal 
communication difficult because of the local employees' and managers' different 
cultural and labor expectations. The impact of unruffled communication not only 
impedes the communication effectiveness between management levels, but also leads 
to misunderstanding between the workers and management. Such incompatible 
practices are more likely to create confrontation, and consequently hinder the smooth 
operation between IJV partners. 
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Chinese Enterprises with Foreign Exchange Shortages 
Tightening of foreign exchange is also an irritating and serious problem for many 
foreign-Chinese IJVs in China. This issue is originated in a long-term economic 
policy towards Chinese enterprise development in the early 1990s (Davidson, 1987). 
The Competitive Handbook (1995) shows that the financial resources among Chinese 
enterprises ranked nearly the lowest among the leading countries such as Hong Kong, 
Taiwan or Japan. This evidence implies that the lack of financial resources will 
severely constrain the firms' technological development (see Table 5). To keep pace 
with modernization, many Chinese enterprises are eager to spend foreign currency to 
purchase imported upgraded machinery and foreign goods (Hsueh & Woo, 1986). 
However, according to the existing foreign trade policy, trading units are allowed to 
retain only a portion of foreign currency for reserve, although the retention rates vary 
among different regions and production activities. In addition, the central policy 
administrators also exert pressures on trading enterprises to cut trade subsidies and 
urge them to pursue the principle of self-responsibility for profits and losses. The 
ultimate objective of this policy is to eliminate all types of direct trade subsidies so as 
to lessen the financial burden of the state and press the trading units to improve their 
efficiency. This constraint, however, further reinforces the tightening of controls on 
transactions involving foreign exchange, bringing many state enterprises into 
operational difficulties. 
One way to resolve this problem is to utilize foreign capital by encouraging foreign 
investments in China in the form ofjoint ventures. However, from the foreign firms' 
perspective, the challenge is how to synchronize their interests with those of local 
partners, and how to control risks through offering appropriate incentives to their 
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venture partners. Surely, this implies that one has to look at the level of risk before 
deciding on the level of investment, especially when operating in a foreign location. In 
order to avoid upfront risks, most of the IJVs start on a small scale of operation 
(Turpin, 1993). In these cases, foreign ventures are less likely to contribute huge 
investments during the initial startup agreement. Previous research also suggests that a 
foreign partner often seeks a smaller investment when the total investment is large 
(Anderson & Gatignon, 1986; Shan, 1991). This is particularly true for Japanese 
investors which prefer to invest in sectors that require small capital investments such 
as apparel and electronics assembly operations (Pan, 1997). If the Japanese firms 
decide to invest in China but are unwilling to commit the necessary investment, the 
Chinese partners have to find other sources of revenues to make up the balance. This 
creates more distress in the Chinese enterprises in the startup operations since they 
inevitably make up for hard currency costs and foreign reserve deficits. 
Lack of Strong Technology Base of Chinese Enterprises 
After more than a decade of economic reform, China has attained a high level of GDP. 
Because of its isolation from the outside world for several decades, Chinese 
enterprises are inherently weak in basic research, R & D infrastructure and 
technological cooperation compared with developed countries such as the USA or 
Japan (Mun & Chan, 1986).4 This is consistent with the findings of the World 
Competitiveness Report (1995) which shows that China's R & D industries and 
source of technology are less favorable in terms of its long-term economic 
development (see Table 5). With respect to technological structure, it is estimated that 
4 China needs to increase info-tech spending. Zhonngguo Shang Bao (China Commercial News), January, 
12,1998. 
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the development force of science and technology among the majority of Chinese 
enterprises is still at the stage of the 1970s. 
With the stagnant technological progress and lack of business talents, the Chinese 
enterprises have long had difficulty in manufacturing internationally recognized 
products. As a greater number of worldwide consumers prefer such qualities as 
modernized, fashionable, and diversified to price alone, China cannot compete with 
top-class manufacturers. Faced with intensive competition in the export market, 
Chinese enterprises mainly constrain their exports to low value-added segments such 
as foodstuff and commodities to balance the massive import of modernized machinery 
and equipment. For example, in the shoes industry, Chinese enterprises manufactured 
over six billion pairs of shoes in 1997 - 60% of the world total, making it the world's 
largest shoe manufacturer as well as the world's largest shoe exporter.^ Although 
Chinese enterprises have succeeded in increasing the export market share of consumer 
commodities, the products are criticized for chuming out cheap low quality copies of 
other countries' designs. This is mainly due to insufficient capital spending on the 
research and development process. Given the constraints on the productivity of low-
price segments, they do not enjoy good profit margins. In the long term, this 
underlying problem will inevitably aggravate the overall balance of trade deficit in 
Chinese enterprises, which will be harmful to their future economic growth and 
resource endowment.^ 
5 Sixty percent of the world wearing shoes "Made in China". Fuzhuang Shibao (Fashion News), October, 
9,1998. 
6 China calls for 'Svorld-class" shoe brands. Jingi Ribao (Economic Daily), September, 15, 1998. 
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Despite the fact that Chinese enterprises have been using obsolete technology, they 
still maintain a basic manufacturing standard. It is possible for them to produce more 
expensive, unique brands which can multiply their profits exponentially, provided that 
they have a pool ofexpertise, such as good designers to develop their own innovative, 
high quality products to capture the worldwide market.? If Chinese enterprises do not 
build up comprehensive systems to cultivate this expertise, they will not be able to 
produce innovative products, and will lose opportunities to capture vast profits. 
One possible solution is to provide proper inservice-training to Chinese managers 
(Lau，1986). In general, training is a form of capital investment which can yield 
mutual rewards on the strategic development of the enterprises. Faced with intensive 
competition between local and foreign rivals, the strategic value of in-service training 
may be extremely important as it increases the company's productivity and efficiency 
on a long-term basis. Through proper in-service training, Chinese managers can leam 
more updated Chinese and Westem management philosophies and methods ofmarket 
economy and a large number of competent trade specialists will be trained in the 
future (Mun & Chan, 1986). However, the impact of financial strain and the lack of 
technology have inevitably led to one consequence: insufficient training opportunities 
among Chinese enterprises (see Table 5). 
Due to cultural and political factors, the importance of training is traditionally 
regarded by Chinese enterprises as an ineffective investment. In the 1995 IMD World 
Competitiveness Report, China was ranked 45 out of 48 economies in terms of in-
7 Sixty percent ofthe world wearing shoes"Made in China". Fuzhuang Shibao (Fashion News) 
October, 9,1998. 厂 
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company training, Japan was ranked the first, Hong Kong was 19 (IMD, 1995) (see 
Table 5). Even though such trainings were available, they were found to be costly and 
ineffective. With the financial squeeze and obsolete technology of Chinese enterprises, 
it is probably impossible to launch either comprehensive training programs or to 
encourage participation in internship programs sponsored by local firms to train their 
employee with specific skills in China (Mun & Chan, 1986). The generalized 
ignorance of in-service training has undoubtedly caused productivity with low quality 
among Chinese enterprises. Under such circumstances, forming a cooperative 
arrangement may be appealing for the Chinese side, so as to provide cheap but 
excellent means oflearning new technology from the foreign partner. 
An equally important issue is that the growth in the foreign parent firm's international 
network can also be used to tap a small pool of the vast market potentials (Shenkar, 
1990). To exploit the increasing potential for economies of scope that accompanies 
such growth, forming cooperative arrangements with a local partner enables the .. 
foreign firm to access its specific local knowledge and to expand their geographic 
scope ofoperations in the host market. It is believed that usingjoint ventures can be a 
quick means to penetrate the local market at the early stages offoreign expansion. 
Regardless ofthe speed of local knowledge acquisition, it is important to emphasize 
that when a foreign partner has an explicit learning intent, the local partner is in a 
vulnerable position. In a developing country venture, the vulnerability of the local 
partner is particularly acute because the local partner is generally not a competitive 
threat to the foreign partner. 
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If the local knowledge is relatively uncomplicated, the acquisition of this knowledge 
and the adaptation of existing operational systems in the host country will be easy. In 
this situation, the foreign partner may try to erase the local partner's dependency 
sooner or later, or may seek a more prominent role in management of thejoint venture, 
leading to greater conflicts over the division of control within the joint venture, which 
in tum leads to an unstable relationship. If the foreign partner has an explicit strategic 
objective of acquiring or leaming local knowledge, this intimidation may be 
interpreted by the local partner as competitive rather than collaborative. Not 
surprisingly, the local partner may deliberately increase the leaming difficulty toward 
the foreign partner or limit a foreign partner's leaming of local knowledge possessed 
by local partners (Beamish & Inkpen, 1995). To cope with these hostilities, the 
foreign firm may also respond by restricting its technology transfer to the Chinese side 
so as to safeguard its beneficial investment (Tse, Francis & Wall, 1994). Under such 
circumstances, instability is more likely to occur together with mutual confrontation. 
It is expected that a joint venture will not last indefinitely, and is more likely to 
dissolute prematurely, compared with a wholly-owned subsidiary. 
i:n conclusion, given the incongruity of the parental objectives between foreign and 
Chinese enterprises in setting up thejoint ventures, they usually face conflicts because 
both will perceive access to local knowledge/technology as the most critical means to 
control the other partner's dependency. Under such circumstances, the foreign-
Chinese IJVs in China are likely to be unstable. The longer JVs have been in such 
operations, the greater will be the number of reorganizations/liquidations as the 
performance problems arise. 
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Inadequate Infrastructure Support 
A related issue toward the problem faced by the foreign investor is the inadequate and 
insufficient development of infrastructure in China. So far, the trade between foreign-
China business has been one of the fastest growth areas since 1978. With the 
projected surge in trade between China and other industrialized nations，this 
phenomenal growth rate has triggered the demand on some basic infrastructure 
facilitates, such as telecommunications, transportation, power generation.^ Realizing 
the importance offirst-class infrastructure to its economic growth, Chinese authorities 
are eager to speed up more concrete plans in upgrading or even modernizing many 
logistics infrastructure such as the highways, railways or port access to catch up with 
trade demand. An unprecedented proportion of the budget has been spent on such 
physical infrastructure development as transportation, communication and electricity 
supply since the implementation of the open door policy. For example, a new airport 
near Guangzhou will be planned by the end of 1998 which is designed to handle 21 
million passengers annually upon the completion of the entire project by 2005 so as to 
meet the increasing demand on the volume of air transport facilities in recent years.^ 
Despite the strenuous effort to expand the existing infrastructure projects, the current 
logistic infrastructure is still unable to meet the business demand and this 
infrastructure is further disrupted by the shortage of money and the destruction by 
summer floods along central and northern part of China/^ On many occasions, 
building a comprehensive and modernized infrastructure involves tremendous 
amounts of capital and time. Due to the shortage of capital among the provincial or 
even the central government, it will take years to complete. 
8 • 
9 China's going need for refrigerated railways cars. JingjiRibao (Economic Daily), January, 14,1999. 
China to build New Airport. Yangcheng Wanbao (Yangcheng Evening News), September, 23，，1998. 
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At present, China's infrastructure lags behind the other modernized nations. The IMD 
World Competitive Report ranked China nearly the lowest in infrastructure 
development among any of the worlds' major nations such as Hong Kong, Japan etc. 
(see Table 5 and its explanation). For instance, for port access infrastructure, China 
(3.6) as compared with Hong Kong (6.87) and Japan (6.71) ； for railroads 
infrastructure, China (1.92) as compared with Hong Kong (6.84) and Japan (8.04). 
The overall rating of infrastructure standards, as indicated by the above figures, 
reflects the infrastructure insufficiencies in China. As many IJVs are scattered in 
remote rural areas, the sophisticated infrastructure to transport their products from one 
city to another via ports, highways or railway systems are deemed to be necessary. 
With the increasing usage and lack of proper maintenance, the lack of sophisticated 
infrastructure will become more and more critical in the future. Although China has 
already offered more favorable incentives towards foreign direct investments, 
incomprehensive infrastructure has proved to be detrimental to the continuous inflow 
offoreign investments. 
M a competitive environment, time is extremely important. It is also necessary to 
deliver products with superior quality and modernized design as fast as possible to 
catch up with customers' taste and style. The excellent ratings of infrastructure and 
delivery processing efficiency serve as one of the considerations among foreign 
investors for the selection of their investment destinations. Many foreign 
entrepreneurs will be more likely to place greater emphasis on the availability of 
comprehensive and efficient infrastructure rather than on one-time investment 
' 'China's highway construction lags behind budget. JmgiRibao (Economic Daily), August, 20, 1998. 
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incentives alone. 
At present, China's infrastructure development poses many problems to foreign 
executives. For example, although the volume of China's cargo carried by ocean-
carrying vessels exceeded that ofHong Kong from 1979 to 1987, Hong Kong’ s cargo 
volume grew faster than that of China, despite the considerable efforts made by the 
latter in the expansion of port facilities. In congruence with the situation faced by 
other Chinese ports, they are of either smaller scale and at an early stage of 
development or face the problems of seabed and silting. These problems are readily 
apparent in many container ports especially along the Pearl River regions which 
handle most of the container activities for the Guangdong province. Only vessels of 
up to 5,000 deadweight tonnes (DTWs) can freely access the port while container 
ships over 30,000 DWTs have to wait for high tides for inner navigation. Even though 
the most modernized and attractive of the Shenkou container ports are located along 
the southern part of Guangdong, its handling capacities are equivalent to only half of 
the Kwai Chung container port. The total number of containers throughout the whole 
of Guangdong is only 0.11 million TEUs (twenty-foot-equivalent units, the standard 
measure of port throughput) in 1990, less than one-third ofthat of Shanghai, which is 
the largest container port in China. In 1990s, the total capacity of containers 
throughout China amounted to only 1.5 million TEUs, with the major portion being 
handled by the ports in the northern cities such as Shanghai, Tianjin, Qingdao and 
Dalian. As the handling capacities in Chinese container ports are limited by their 
natural structure and degree of operation scale, many goods have to queue up for a 
long time prior to processing and packaging at the container ships (Hong Kong 
Business, 1993). 
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Because of the extensive bureaucratic structure of the Chinese shipping companies, 
they operate such trans-shipment in a low-efficient manner and an erratic delivery 
schedule is commonly seen. For example, the average docking time of external trade 
vessels ranges from 8.7 to 11.1 days in Chinese ports, whereas the average is only 2.5 
days for container vessels in Hong Kong. From the economic perspective, it is much 
easier to ship the goods directly between China to the USA, or to tran-ship through 
Japan, rather than through Hong Kong (Hong Kong Business, 1993; Sung, 1991). This 
trans-shipment may be attributed to some crucial factors, such as shipping services, 
freight rate, delivery schedule etc. On many occasions, the trip quotes a lengthy period 
which the goods will be loaded in Japan for long time before shipping to the USA. 
Needless to say, foreign traders cannot notify US importers ofthe exact arrival date of 
shipment. It is interesting to note that the problem of delivery schedule and low-
efficiency often cause bitter consequence for foreign traders to transship their exports 
through Japan. 
hi order to guarantee the on-time delivery schedule, many traders prefer to select 
exports from northern or central China to the USA via Hong Kong instead of Japan. 
Trans-shipping of goods though Hong Kong has the advantage that Hong Kong 
traders can quote Chinese shipping companies in Hong Kong on the date of loading, 
and thus notify the US importer about the date of arrival. When delays occur, Hong 
Kong traders can convert the trans-shipment into re-export, take legal possession of 
the goods in Hong Kong, and re-export the goods to the United States through other 
shipping companies. The higher level of trans-shipment through Hong Kong may 
reflect the lack of container facilities in Chinese ports, the infi-equency of direct 
voyages to other countries of destination and internal distortions (particularly 
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unreliable shipping schedules) (Sung, 1991). In fact, many foreign exporters in China 
believe that it is more reliable to export through Hong Kong, as cost-effectiveness is 
enhanced through the mediation of local traders and professionals, and through the 
efficient processing and transshipment of goods. 
As a consequence of unacceptable delays, potential international partners are 
sometimes alarmed by the poor infrastructure developments in China. Such 
unacceptable delivery delays often create widespread dissatisfaction among foreign 
investors. Indeed, the rating of infrastructure among the advanced nations is roughly 
thirty times greater than that of China. Such a gap will be a major source offrustration 
and disgruntlement of expatiate staff, causing conflict between foreign and local staff, 
and discouraging foreign firms to invest in China. 
Hong Kong Firms' Advantage in Interconnecting Economic and 
Socio-Cultural Systems between the East and the West 
In this section, I overview trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) patterns in Hong 
Kong，Japan, and China. Perhaps it is possible for foreign firms to cooperate with 
other Chinese firms alone to form IJVs and still remain vivid and independent in 
China. However, what drives and under which circumstances do the above two 
partners align with another party (Hong Kong firm)? We are also looking at the 
advantage of using Hong Kong firms to foster and interconnect different economic 
and socio-cultural systems between Japanese and Chinese firms. 
The Role of Hong Kong Companies: the Source of Boosting the 
Competitive Advantage ofFuture Foreign-Chinese Joint Venture 
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According to the comment from the Chuk (1998) that one of the most fundamental 
causes of the Asian financial crisis is the lack of competitive advantage in Asian 
countries. As the occurrences of the Asian crisis severely curtail the overall economic 
systems of Asian countries, this offers a valuable opportunity for the international 
speculators to fiirther devastate their economic infrastructures. Theoretically, Japan 
should have suffered the most during the Asian financial crisis because of extensive 
difficulties in banking and other financial sectors. Owing to robust competitive 
advantages among Japanese enterprises, many of their products are virtually on a non-
price competitiveness basis, causing no excuse for international speculators to seize 
on their economic systems, particularly on their industrial and financial infrastructure. 
Basically, the most prominence analysis, in accordance to the authors' analysis, can be 
summarized into the following factors i.e. (1) supply is greater than demand; perhaps 
there is no market demand for high-priced products; (2) lack ofcore competency; (3) 
deficiency of innovative and creative investment. On many occasions, many 
enterprises misunderstand and even violate these factors, resulting in the production of 
unrelated products with no market orientation at all. 
To foster long-term international competitiveness, the globalization trend forces many 
foreign firms to consider the possibility of reducing their costs by shifting part oftheir 
production processes to less-cost countries. With the procession of core competency 
on sophisticated technology, the firms can manufacture many specialized and 
innovative products at a reduce cost compared with their rivals. Ultimately, they can 
increase their market sizes and profitability and resist major external threats (Chen, 
1994). From the Chinese firms' perspective, increasing foreign direct investment is a 
convenient and powerflil instrument for the infUsion of capital and acquisition of 
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technology transfer which further enhances their export potential. Specifically, this 
combined strategy can enable them to build up core technology, develop new products, 
and restructure the traditional industries. For this reason, the establishment of 
cooperative joint ventures has become quite popular in recent years (Pan 8c Yan, 
1996). 
However, since China has very different economic and political conditions, the 
foreign investors may see more risks of investment in China, and soon lose their 
initial enthusiasm. To reduce the investment risk, firms investing in China should 
seek help from some intermediaries who know China's regulations, language and 
customs, and human relations very well. For convenience and safety reasons, many 
firms also establish their regional subsidiaries in Hong Kong as the gateway to China 
trade. As long as the promising growth of the Chinese economy in the coming 
decades continues, the role ofHong Kong as an investment intermediary will become 
more and more important in the foreseeable future. 
Intermediary Organization 
International trade intermediaries, such as export management companies (EMCs), 
have long existed in the USA and other regions (Perry, 1990). With the increased 
level of globalization, the use of an intermediary organization is regarded as an 
essential resource to build up the competitive advantage ofsmall domestic firms. Up 
to now, there is no formal or universally accepted consensus on the definition and 
measurement of "intermediary organization". In this study, we adopted the 
definition by Hester (1985), "a company doing business in overseas countries with the 
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Table 5 
Comparison of Cultural Dimension, Entrepreneurship and Innovation, 
Infrastructure, Scientific Research and Education System between China, Hong 
Kong, Taiwan, Japan, USA and United Kingdom 





index(PDI) 90 68 58 54 40 35 
Individualism- H = e 
Collectivism scale (IDS) 20 25 17 46 91 89 
Muscularity Feminine Scale 66 57 45 95 62 66 
(MAS) 




International experience and 
senior management*^ 2.52 7.47 16,48 5.50 5.88 6.84 
Corporate credibility*^ 7.42 7.32 6.94 6.88 6.22 5.56 IMD 
Competent senior manger*^ 2.34 5.59 5.62 4.46 6.92 5.79 (1995) 
Skilllabor*4 4.58 4.77 5.59 6.79 6.10 5.61 
Infrastructure 
Road*5 2.30 6.62 4.22 5.46 8.34 5.49 
Airporttransport*6 3.60 6.87 6.03 6.71 9.72 7.74 IMD 
Railroad *^  4.92 7.84 4.88 8.04 9.75 8.63 (1995) 
Port access *^  3.38 7.90 6.50 7.71 8.72 9.74 
Scientific Research 
Basic research*^ 4.30 5.13 5.59 5.59 6.23 5.88 
Scienceandeducation*io 5.98 6.67 7.08 5.79 4.00 3.71 
R&Dinkeyindustries*" 6.42 6.21 5.50 7.25 7.05 5.16 IMD 
Sourcingoftechnology*i2 7.46 5.90 5.59 6.33 7.00 5.21 (1995) 
Technological cooperation *^ ^ 3.66 4.84 5.56 6.08 5.90 5.47 
Education System ^ D 
In-companytraining*i4 3.97 5.74 6.47 8.04 5.65 5.10 (1995) 
Source: IMD International & World Economic Forum 1995. The World 
Competitive Report, 1995, Switzerland: The foundation. 
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Notes 1 International experience and senior management: 10-point ratings: 
the lowest ratings means senior management in your company is 
usually not experienced in international business 
2 Corporate credibilty: 10 point ratings: the lowest ratings means companies 
do not enjoy public trust 
3 Skilled labor: 10-point ratings: the lowest ratings means skilled labor is 
hard to get in your country 
4 In-service training: 10 point ratings: the lowest ratings means companies 
neglect training their employees 
5 Roads: 10 point ratings: the lowest ratings means roads infrastructure 
does not meet business requirement 
6 Air transport: 10 point ratings: the lowest ratings means air 
transport infrastructure does not meet business requirement 
7 Railroads: 10 point ratings: the lowest ratings means railroads infrastructure 
not meet business requirement 
8 Port access: 10 point ratings: the lowest ratings means port access 
infrastructure does not meet business requirement 
9 Basic research: 10 point ratings: the lowest ratings means the basic research 
not currently support long-term economic and technological development 
10 Science and education: 10 point ratings: the lowest ratings means science is 
not adequately taught in compulsory schools 
11 R & D in key industries: 10 point ratings: the lowest ratings means R & D 
in key industries is often behind foreign companies 
12 Sourcing of technology:10 point ratings: the lowest ratings means 
sourcing oftechnology by domestic companies is inferior 
compared to international competitors 
13 Technological cooperation: 10 point ratings: the lowest ratings 
means technological cooperation is lacking between companies decrease in 
real terms over the next two years 
14 In-service training:10 point ratings: the lowest ratings means companies 
neglect training their employees 
main purpose of exporting their goods and services, and aiding unrelated companies 
in export their products and services abroad". Hong Kong's intermediary role 
involves a wide range of business facets between different partners. In this study, we 
assume that a Hong Kong firm, as a third partner to a foreign-Chinese JV, plays a 
significant role in interconnecting the country specific advantages of the home 
country ofthe foreign partner and those of China. In the following section, we discuss 
how Hong Kong plays an intermediary role in linking national advantages offoreign 
countries (developed countries) and China. 
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Hong Kong: as an Economic Center for Trade and Investment to 
China 
Hong Kong has been recognized as one of the world's most prosperous financial and 
trading centers. Because of its superb economic performance, Hong Kong is 
acclaimed as one ofAsia,s four "dragons". However, the investment environment in 
Hong Kong has drastically changed in recent years. The unstable political impasse 
between British and China over the political reform has changed the economic 
conditions in China. For example, in 1993, the Chinese government tightened 
financial credit over the state-dominant companies to cool down the overheating 
economy. As a result, Hong Kong's outward export has abruptly slowed down and 
this has affected the overall economy. Other factors such as the persistent high-value 
property policy have led to a substantial economic strain towards foreign firms in 
Hong Kong. In addition, political risks such as the Tienanmen Square incident 
occurred in 1989, and the handover in 1997 has further destabilized the confidence of 
the foreign investors in Hong Kong. Some Japanese companies even considered the 
relocation of their regional head offices out of Hong Kong, anticipating that the 
investment environment will further deteriorate (Sohma, 1995). 
Although Hong Kong has been under prolonged economic recession, it has kept an 
advanced position among the developed economies (GDP per capita) (Enright, Scott 
& Dodwell, 1997) (see Table 5). According to the World Competitive Report (1995), 
in every dimension of the reported measures of competitiveness, Hong Kong was 
ranked among the top three nations (Enright, Scott & Dodwell，1997).i! The US_ 
based Heritage Foundation has also ranked the Hong Kong as the world's freest 
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trading area. M addition, the signing of the Sino-British Joint Declaration provides 
reassurance to all trading partners that the basis for Hong Kong's free market 
economy will continue. 
Given its favorable investment environment, Hong Kong has become one ofthe most 
attractive sites for foreign investors to setup their regional business in Asia (Enright, 
Scott & Dodwell，1997). Many Japanese companies generally remain sanguine 
towards the future of Hong Kong, and now actively invest in a wide range of 
industrial sections-including financial, retail and manufacturing industries in Hong 
Kong. Japan is the largest source of foreign investment in Hong Kong, with the total 
volume of investment increasing from 11.0 to 14.6 HK$ billion from 1991 to 1993, 
followed by USA, from 9.6 to 10.6 HK$ billion, and China, from 3.7 to 4.8 HK$ 
billion. A survey showed that more than 80% of the Japanese enterprises showed 
enthusiasm towards investment in Hong Kong as a regional base to link up more in 
China trade (Fukuda & Chu，1994; Sohma, 1995). From the period between 1990 to 
1995, a total of342 regional headquarters were established. To sum up, this reflects 
the attractiveness of Hong Kong for overseas parent companies to set up their 
regional headquarters more favored than other rivals such as Singapore or South 
Korea (Suda, 1994). 
The Japan 
While China is becoming one ofHong Kong's most important trade partners, Japan 
is still higher on the list. Jn 1994, the Japan was in the top third of the leading 
u The search to find a winning game. South China Morning Post, July, 1, 1997. 
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destinations for Hong Kong's exports (see Table 9). Internal factors in Japan also 
contribute to the huge capital investment in Hong Kong. During the past decades, 
there has been an acute shortage of manpower in Japan, which has further pushed up 
wages and the rate of inflation in Japan. As a result, labor costs, particularly for 
small-and medium-sized companies, have increased, and this has undermined Japan's 
competitive advantage. In responding to such a situation, many Japanese firms have 
invested abroad especially in the areas close to Japan, for example, Hong Kong and 
China (Pan, 1996; Pan & Tse, 1996). With the subsequent economic growth in Hong 
Kong and neighboring regions such as China and other Asian countries, the amount 
of Japanese investment is expected to further expand in future. For these reasons, 
Hong Kong is expected to become one of the favorite sites for Japanese firms 
investing business investment in China (Broadfoot, 1991). 
China 
China is characterized by a collective Eastern culture with a socialist legal and 
political system that has grown out of the communist doctrine (Lan, 1987). While the 
mainland economy has boomed, the exploration and utilization of the natural 
resources, and managerial and technology know-how are still inefficient. In addition, 
due to different cultural and environmental uniqueness, entry to the Chinese market is 
particularly difficult. Even though the foreign firms can legally operate in China, they 
have to go through an arduous process, resulting in a high failure rate. 
Opportunities, Geographical Location and Human Factors Have 
Brought about Hong Kong's Unique Status and Role in China's 
Opening Up 
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For Hong Kong firms to become successful intermediaries for international trade 
between China and the West (Japan), they have to provide suitable locations, 
convenient transportation, and fast and reliable communication to both partners. In 
the following section, we explore the following questions: Why can Hong Kong firms 
play such an important intermediary role in boosting the IJV between foreign 
(Japanese) and Chinese IJVs. 
Table 6 
Gross Domestic Product by Expenditure Component at Current Market Prices 
$HK Million 
Expenditure Components of GDP 1993 1994 J ^ 
Private consumption expenditure 514,239 590,99i 653,671 
Government consumption expenditure 72,620 83.316 95,263 
Gross domestic fixed capital formation 245,182 297.238 322,410 
Changes in inventories 2,299 28,004 65,283 
Total exports o f g o o d s (f.o.b.) 1,046,250 — 1,170,013 1 , 3 4 4 , I ? 7 ~ 
Less imports o f g o o d s (c.i.f) 1,075,710 一 1,254,427 1 , 4 9 5 , ^ ~ 
Exports of services 215,577 ~ ~ 243,907 291,030 
Less imports of services 122,994 142,475 164,657 
GDP (expenditure-based estimate) at current 897,4063 1,016,567 i j i i , 3 9 1 
market prices 
Per capita GDP at current market price ($) 151,624 167,712 179,552 
Sources: Howlett, B & Information Services Department. 1996. Hong Kong 1996. 
Hong Kong: Hong Kong Government Printer. 
Similarity Between Hong Kong, China and the West (Japan) 
Trade policy 
Hong Kong has been a British colony for more than a century. It adopts laissez-faire 
capitalism and the British legal system which is comparable to that in the USA and 
Japan (Bond & King, 1985; Lau & Kuan, 1988; Lethbridge, 1984) (see Table 5). 
Thus, Hong Kong has important commercial links and common cultural traditions 
with many westem countries. The future administration of Hong Kong and the 
preservation of Hong Kong's economic, political and legal systems will remain 
unchanged and will be stringently governed by the Basic Law for 50 years beyond 1st 
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July 1997 (Fung & Wong, 1996). Under such circumstances, setting up business in 
Hong Kong is relatively secure, and foreign enterprises can still enjoy a high degree 
ofautonomy without many restrictions (Lethbridge, 1984). 
Language 
In Hong Kong, most Hong Kong citizens are Cantonese-speaking, and adhere to 
Chinese traditional culture (Bond & King, 1985; Cheng, 1986; Enright, Scott & 
Dodwell, 1997; Lau & Kuan, 1988; Siu-lun, 1986). In its educational system, both 
English and Chinese are official languages in Hong Kong. English is more 
recognized and widely used in many educational institutions, in both private and 
public sectors. This educational system has provided a large, skilled English-speaking 
labor force in Hong Kong which has eliminated the communication barriers faced by 
the foreign expatriate managers (Bond & King, 1985) (see Table 5). Therefore, it is 
very easy to recruit bilingual professional experts in Hong Kong. 
Geographic Proximity 
One of the competitive advantages of Hong Kong is its excellent geographical 
location in the center of the Far East with the closest proximity to the southeast 
region of China (Enright, Scott & Dodwell, 1997; Mun & Chan, 1986; 
Nontapunthawat, 1994). For many reasons，Hong Kong is fully integrated into the 
Chinese economy. China is Hong Kong's largest trading partner, and the largest 
market source for domestic exports, re-exports and suppliers of imports. China is 
arguably Hong Kong's principal external investor with the total investment estimated 
by local sources at US$20 billion (Fung & Wong, 1996). Apart from these 
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advantages, Hong Kong has already built up an extensive network in China and 
Taiwan. As Tables 6,7,8,9,10 andll show, there are massive trade volumes of 
imports, exports, re-exports and domestic exports from various destinations. In view 
ofthe extensive economic and commercial links between Hong Kong and China, it is 
expected that cross-border commercial and business trade will be increased 
significantly between the two. Hong Kong firms probably play significant 
intermediary roles in promoting the interflow of trade and capital investment between 
various foreign countries and China. In fact, many foreign firms have already made 
indirect trades with China through Hong Kong (Soesastro, 1994). 
Infrastructure 
Hong Kong is a free port with many supporting infrastructures. The highly 
modernized container port and airport together with the modernized warehouse 
systems enable Hong Kong firms to keep up with the tremendous growth in the 
import, export and re-export industries (Enright, Scott & Dodwell， 1997; 
Nontapunthawat, 1994) (see Table 7,8,9,10). Moreover, a well-established network of 
telecommunication systems is a vital component for making Hong Kong an 
international financial center. Since Hong Kong has developed a variety of 
communication services, foreign investors can easily give feedback to their head 
offices about such local market information as local customer demand and changes in 
investment policy in China (Enright, Scott & Dodwell, 1997; Mun & Chan，1996; 
Nontapunthawat, 1994). 
Similarity in Cultural Systems between Hong Kong, China and the 
West 
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In the previous section, we discuss how internal factors of Hong Kong such as 
infrastructure and geographical location would stabilize the confidence of foreign 
subsidiaries for their investments in China. This section examines another facet of 
Hong Kong's intermediary role--the cultural system. When starting business in China, 
many foreign firms encounter numerous problems caused by cultural dissimilarities 
and unique business practices in China (Beamish, 1993; Hu & Chen, 1993; Pan & 
Tse, 1996; Stewart & Delisle, 1994). Certainly, Western-and Eastern-value systems 
differ in terms of dominant religion, belief, language and norms. According to 
Ralston, Holt, Terpstra and Cheng (1997), the US represents a capitalism system that 
has evolved out ofthe British economic and political system while China represents a 
collective socialistic system that has grown out of communism. Since Westem and 
Eastem social systems are positioned in the opposite poles, companies from both 
systems should differ in their management practices and strategic directions. For 
example, Greene (1991) mentioned that if foreign enterprises in China intended to 
hire professional skilled workers，they would often have to go through a time-
consuming and frustrating process before obtaining the permission for employment 
from the government. For example, they had to seek the approval from the local labor 
bureau for the affairs of internal staff transfer, but such a procedure could take several 
months to complete before they obtain legal permission. In addition，the IJV should 
pay expensive compensation, which typically ranges between US $1,000 to 3,000 per 
each staffs transferal for the loss of skilled labor. 
As shown in table, in every dimension of Hofstedes' (1980) cultural indices, the 
cultural distances between Hong Kong and westem countries such as Japan, USA or 
British are much shorter than those between China and these countries. For instance, 
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power distance scale is 22(90-68), individual-collectivism scale is 5(25-20), 
muscularity scale is 9(66-57), uncertainty avoidance index 16(40-29) between China 
and Hong Kong, while the same cultural distances between Japan and China are 
36(90-54), 26(20-46), 29(95-66) and 52(92-40) respectively. 
Clearly, from the above evidence, Japan, the U.S. and China exhibit major 
differences with respect to the four cultural dimensions. In this study, we focus solely 
on one dimension which has frequently been used in previous studies (Hofstede 1980; 
Pan & Yan, 1996; Yeh & Lawrence, 1995) that is, the Individualism-Collectivism. I 
found that the USA scored the highest (91) on the dimension ofIndividualism, while 
Japan was ranked lower than the US (46). Japan scored higher than Hong Kong (25), 
and China had the lowest score on Individualism (20) owing to historical influences 
such as collectivism, social interaction, and team approach in Chinese society (Wang, 
1994). Furthermore, one interesting observation in Table 5 is that Japan is supposed 
to be a very collective society in principle, in contrast to the U.S., but interestingly, its 
political and economic systems are in many ways similar to those ofthe US. 
Table 7 
External Trade Statistics in Hong Kong 
($ HK million) 
Y ^ r imports Domestic Re-exports Total Trade Merchandise 
exports trade balance 
1994 1,250,709 222,092 947,921 2,420,722 -80 695 一 
1995 1,491,121 231,657 — 1,112,470 2,835,248 “ -146,994 
1996 1,535,582 212,160 1,185,758 2,933,499 — -137,664一 
1997 1,615090 211,410 1,244,539 3,071,040 -159,141 
Source: Census and Statistics Department (1997). HongKongMonthly 
Digest ofStatistic, Hong Kong: Hong Kong Government Printer. 
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Table 8 
Unit Value Indices and Quantum Indices ofRe-export by Main Destination 
(1990=100) ($ HK million) 
Main Destination | 1994 | 1995 | 1996 1997 
Unit Value Indice 
^ t e d States ofAmerica 108.1 111.9 113.5 113.8 
The mainland ofChina 102.7 “ 107.8 一 105.4 102.7 
United Kingdom 108.9 “ 107.8 — 106.9 ~ 108.5 一 
Federal Republic ofGermany 103.5 107.0 108.5 “ 109.6 
Japan 104.8 108.4 “ 108.2 106.2 
Singapore 100.0 103.3 105.5 102.5 
Quantum Value Indice 
United States of America 221.8 237.2 246.8 267.8 — 
The mainland ofChina 286.5 “ 329.3 一 367.6 402,6 
United Kingdom 211.1 “ 251.3 — 284.1 303.8 
Federal Republic of Germany 172.8 — 183.7 一 ^ 8 7 j ^ ~ f g i ^ 
Japan 216.2 “ 269.0 _ 310.0 308.2 
Singapore 158.8 196.7 209.3 224.6 
Source: same as Table 7 
Table 9 
Unit Value Indices and Quantum Indices ofImports by Main Supplier 
(1990=100) ($ HK million) 
Main Destination 1994 | 1995 1995 J ^ 
Unit Value Indice 
The mainland ofChina 102.8 107.6 110.0 110.6 
Japan — 109.1 “ 115.3 — 108.7 102.6 
Taiwan 104.7 ~ ~ 1 1 3 . 8 —109.9 106.9 
United States ofAmerica 108.7 — 111.7 ~ f o 7 ^ j [ o ^ 
United Kingdom 104.9 106.1 107.2 f ^ 
Quantum Value Indice 
The mainland of China 193.4 211.9 ~ 2 T 0 23^5 
Japan 174.7 189.8 “ 189.3 “ 213 4 
Taiwan 177.3 — 195.3 —193.0 197.9 
United States of America 161.4 202.3 221.1 2 3 ^ 
United Kingdom 173.4 — 205.9 一 224.0 ~ ~ 2 4 2 ^ 
Source: same as Table 7 
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Table 10 
Unit Value Indices and Quantum Indices ofRe-export by Main Destination 
(1990=100) ($ HK million) 
Main Destination | 1994 | 1995 | 1996 1997 
Unit Value Indice 
United States ofAmerica 110.4 113.2 113.9 109.9 
The mainland ofChina 101.9 — 105.0 104.8 f o i l 
Federal Republic ofGermany 105.2 — 108.2 ^ Q M Z Z I m s 
United Kingdom 98.8 98.7 “ 98.8 100.4 
Japan 108.9 113.6 “ 111.7 108.9 
Singapore 107.7 108.0 105.8 100.6 
Quantum Value Indice 
United States ofAmerica 84.2 82.3 71.7 76.5 
The mainland of China 126.1 一 127.5 i ^ i l y ^ 
Federal Republic of Germany 7Q.1 — 65.1 ^ JsA 
United Kingdom 77.0 — 82.0 79.1 ~ ~ 7 ^ 
Japan 81.2 88.3 “ 85.7 “ 83.1 
Singapore 148.9 148.5 123.1 107.2 
Source: same as Table 7 
Table 5 suggests, cultural and economic gaps in every dimension between Japan and 
China are much wider than those between Japan and Hong Kong. This implies that it 
is unsafe for Japanese firms to conduct business transactions independently in China, 
where there is greater discrepancy in national culture (Black, 1990; Black & 
Mendenhall, 1994; Li, 1994; Stening & Hammer, 1992; Tung, 1986). Many 
inexperienced firms, particularly those from the western economic and cultural 
systems, may perceive investment in China as bearing high risks. In this aspect, it is 
suggested that Japanese firms should extend their business to a place where cultural 
distance is small. Hong Kong has long adopted the western economic and social 
systems, while maintaining both ethnic and cultural links with China. Business 
environments in Hong Kong are more similar to those in Japan than to those in China, 
and the cultural gap between Hong Kong and Japan is much smaller than that between 
Japan and China. For this reason, it is better for Japanese firms to align with Hong 
Kong firms in their IJVs with Chinese partners or even relocate their regional offices 
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to Hong Kong prior to entry to the Chinese market. 
To sum up, Hong Kong firms possess many superior intermediary characteristics that 
may act as the springboard to the China market. Certainty, the benefit of having a 
Hong Kong based partner in the foreign-Chinese IJVs should outweigh the cost of 
having a third party in the JV. As Kelley et al (1987) note, it is important to identify a 
JV partner from a country which has a similar set of economic, legal and educational 
systems, and a common culture. In this study, we assume that a Hong Kong firm can 
play a role as intermediary between foreign and Chinese IJVs. 
Why the Intermediary Organization Formed : 
The Theory ofInternational Trade in Intermediary Services 
Since the inauguration of the open-door policy, China has developed numerous 
economic diplomatic, commercials and transportation links with other countries, and 
the intermediary role ofHong Kong has been becoming more prominent. To explain 
this intermediary function, I have adopted the theory by Sung (1991). The theory has 
strong predication for the role of intermediary services provided by Hong Kong 
companies. The fundamental concepts of the theory include the following elements: 
(1) an explanation of the need for intermediation; (2) an analysis of the economie 
scale and economies of agglomeration in supplying intermediary trading services as 
they increase the efficiency of intermediation, and (3) an analysis on the provision of 
intermediary services by a foreign firm (versus a domestic firm). In the following 
section, each element will be briefly reviewed. 
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The important point made with regard to the first element is that the intermediation is 
a solution for reducing transaction costs. It is obvious that international trade of 
intermediate goods usually involves higher transaction costs than internal trade 
because of greater physical, cultural and sociological differences between the parties. 
Li addition, intermediary firms have better sources of marketing information than 
producers or exporters, and can reduce the risk of exchange rate fluctuations by 
engaging both importing and exporting simultaneously. The second element of the 
theory outlines that the need for intermediation will be even greater with the existence 
ofeconomies of scale in the production of trading services, because smaller producers 
will not be able to trade efficiently. It is shown that significant economies of scale 
exist in the production of trading services because it usually involves large fixed costs 
and small or declining marginal costs. The economies of agglomeration are equally 
important because ofthe external economies that arise from the tendencies oftraders 
to agglomerate in a city. Once a city acquires a comparative advantage in entrepot 
trade, it is believed that the advantage tends to persist. The third element refers to the 
need ofless-developed countries that still lack the necessary skills to trade efficiently. 
The use offoreign firms in providing trading services can reduce the transaction costs 
that arise from the cultural and product heterogeneity. 
Decentralization and Intermediation 
Li the past, China centralized its external trade activity under the control of the 
Ministry ofForeign trade and the large import-export trading corporations such as the 
China Resources Company. With the adoption of the modernization program in 1979, 
some regions and local enterprises were allowed to exercise their autonomies in trade 
directly with foreign enterprises. However, it is very costly for an individual firm to 
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establish trade links because of enormous transaction c o s t � � Inermediation emerges to 
economize on the cost of establishing trade links. Li this section, we discuss the Hong 
Kong firms' intermediary role in a final product market in China. 
Hong Kong Firm as a Facilitator 
As discussed above, China's economic reform and open-door policy will continue to 
bring about additional trade opportunities to the Asian Pacific Region. However, 
China lacks the skills necessary for successful intermediary services, including 
insurance, finance, communication, marketing and legal services (Sung, 1991). Such 
skills are relatively easily accessed in Hong Kong. By offering foreign firms such 
intermediary services as the releasing of information about the situation of the 
Chinese economy and trade practices in China, Hong Kong firms can facilitate the 
development ofChina trade. For example, a Japanese firm with a technology which is 
desirable from China's perspective may wish to enter the Chinese market but lack the 
particular managerial resources or cultural knowledge to do so. It can, however, 
provide the technology to the Hong Kong firms (either through the license or joint 
venture) (Beamish & Wang, 1989). With their detailed business knowledge, unique 
geographical position, and cultural ties to China, Hong Kong firms have become ideal 
trade partners for Japanese firms, and have created more trade opportunities in the 
Chinese market (Enright, Scott & Dodwwdl, 1997). 
(1) Hong Kong as a Local Conduit/Gateway to the Local Market 
: S ^ g (1991) showed that the fixed costs such as supervision and coordination related to establish a 
j u " = trade liak should decrease but the transaction costs should increase because these firms have to 
= l d up some ftindamental services, such as finance, communications, marketing and legal services 
t>etore engagmg m trade. ^ 
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As mentioned earlier, the consequence of the decentralization in China has 
undoubtedly provided more trade autonomies and flexibility to the foreign investors, 
particularly in export-oriented activities. Nonetheless, many foreign firms are 
frustrated when making partnerships with Chinese partners because they often cannot 
easily find the right partners in China due to insufficient official information of 
Chinese enterprises.^^ 
However, this problem can be resolved if a foreign firm invites a Hong Kong 
company in its JV with a Chinese partner. Hong Kong firms, especially those Hong 
Kong-based trading firms, have an extensive direct investment throughout the all 
regions of China. These firms are very familiar with the domestic environment in 
China，including the nature of the business and the scale of operations in term of 
profits.i4 Through the alignment of Hong Kong firms, it should be fast and cost-
effective decision to locate the most compatible partners from a pool of potential 
targets to match with their strategic objectives. 
Now，there is a greater trend of using exhibitions as a means of partner search. In a 
highly competitive commercial society, exhibitions have almost become essential. 
Chinese exhibitions are more frequently held worldwide; however, the outcome is not 
13 - ? ^ ^ ¾ and Wang (1989) found that one common strategy employed by foreign firms to fmd a 
^ t , W e JV partner is to keep writmg/telexing to a local government to ask whether there is a need for 
iocal enterprises to cooperate with foreign firms in China. However, this is a somewhat redundant 
p>cess because it is ahnost impossible to select the most suitable partner from thousands oflocal firms 
= : h province. Even when possible, time and search costs to locate the potential partners may be 
reso^eUsScBeaJ^/sShPf^cf r y ‘ t o _ task for smaller to m e d i ^ firms with limited capital and 
K n ^ < f ^ T r . l ^ n ^ T Kong ^adin^ fi^s have successfully built up close associations with the Hong 
f a ^ e J i ^ o ^ S r w ^ ' C o ^ i j . The Council can help a foreign firm to fmd a suitable Chinesl 
l n T r i l weJJ-organized mformation system which contains the data ofmore than 18,000 local 
( � l i S ^ r ^ V ^ ^ u g c t ^ e r s， e x p o r t e r s and importers, and more than 80,000 overseas importers 
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always satisfactory.'^ In contrast, exhibitions are more successful in Hong Kong]6 
Owing to its strategic geographical convenience, Hong Kong is at a uniquejunction at 
the Far Eastem region for business traveling. 
Li many manufacturing exhibitions, such as to promote collaborative projects among 
the provincial enterprises, Hong Kong mangers have been able to capture the unique 
features of Chinese enterprises, such as cost-sensitive mass production. In addition, 
they posses a pool of expertise in marketing, sales and promotion in China. 
On general considerations, inexperienced foreign firms should seek the help from 
“local experts" who are familiar with China and utilize their available infrastructure 
and personal connections before making any collaborative decision with the Chinese 
partners (Beamish & Wang, 1989; Shigeo, 1995). Such historical backgrounds create 
a sense of attachment to their origins, and hence, Hong Kong managers can easily 
build up personal networks with local officials in China” 
Hong Kong investors have also committed a lot of investments in entire regions in 
China. They have shifted the value-added and export-oriented processing or part of 
their-labor intensive production process to the coastal area of China. Such intimate 
15 For example, similar Chinese enterprises also held shows in Guangdong but the number ofapproved 
cooperative projects was far below the expected number (Sung, 1991). 
According to the survey conducted by the Trading Development Council in 1997，Hong Kong ranked 
fifth in the list of metropolitans under the "number of international meetings per city" category. More 
than a hundred international conventions have taken place in Hong Kong (Hong Kong Trading 
DevelopmentCouncil, 1999). ^ 
Over 95 % of Hong Kong population are of Chinese ethnic origin and share certain common 
cultural background, customs, habits, and ethnic relations with Chinese mangers. The majority ofHong 
^ong managers are first or second generation immigrants or refugees from Guangdong during 
Kuommtang-Communist civil war and the subsequent political campaign launched by Chinese 
Communist during early 1950s and 1960s (Bond & King’ 1985; Cheng, 1986; Lau & Kuan 1988) 
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cooperation is the manifestation of mutual trust, and Hong Kong businessmen's 
operational experience in China” 
Because of these advantages, Hong Kong firms not only expedite foreign partners to 
build up trustful and reliable “gimnxi” with Chinese partners, but also heighten the 
foreign firms' bargaining position over the local Chinese partners. Due to a relatively 
tight relationship between Hong Kong firms and Chinese officials, the enacted date of 
announced foreign-Chinese IJV can be commenced in a short interval when Hong 
Kong firms are part of JV partners (Beamish, 1993; Leung & Yeung, 1995). 
Perhaps the most important consequence of the decentralization policy is the grant of 
special privilege to foreign enterprises under the influence ofthe Hong Kong partners. 
For much of the past decade, foreign enterprises found it hard to break into the 
network in many key industries such as construction, architecture and financial sectors. 
But now, with the implementation of decentralization policy, the local provincial-
level administrative departments are allowed to implement their own policies to keep 
up with the change of modernization program. Under this policy, once the local 
officials approve the projects to go ahead, these projects will be joint-contracted by 
foreign and Chinese companies.^^ Because of the long-term coordination and mutual 
tmst developing between Hong Kong firms and Chinese officials, through Hong Kong 
firms，mediation, foreign enterprises are then allowed to make joint ventures with 
Chinese enterprises in a variety of industries such as energy, transportation, 
L ^ i V n ' S ™ ^ ^ business accounts for over 80� /�of l2,232 solely foreign-funded enterprises Chinese-
i994f cooperative enterprises, running harmoniously with Chinese partaers (Chen, 
O c S , ^ ^ ' 9 T ^ " ' construction industry to foreign companies, Jianzhu Bao (Construction News), 
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infrastructure which can probably increase the foreign partners' enthusiasm toward 
investments in China (Sung, 1991)?^ In some occasions, in order to facilitate the 
foreign investments, many Chinese enterprises and local authorities set up 
representative offices in Hong Kong as trading corporations. Since the trading firm is 
nominally operated by a Hong Kong trader, approval from Beijing is not necessary, hi 
this way, Hong Kong firms can serve as the gateway for Chinese enterprises to 
interact with the external world, and enhance better economic cooperation between 
Hong Kong, the mainland and foreign enterprises (Sung, 1991). 
(2) Hong Kong as a Location for Different Kind ofFirms 
The agglomeration of various types of multinational firms will contribute to making 
Hong Kong one of the most world's important financial centers.�� When this 
argument is applied to Hong Kong, we will expect that Hong Kong has long been 
qualified to be an attractive and favorable financial and regional hub for many 
multinational companies. 
Business interests from all parts of the world have not been diminished by the 
prospect ofthe territory's political transaction. Hong Kong is still a favorable business 
center for overseas and Chinese investors when dealing throughout Asian regions, 
particularly in China?^ Among the other things, many international firms are 
20 ibid 21 
Sung (1991) argued that the economies of agglomeration is achieved because of the external 
economies arismg from the tendencies oftraders and firms being agglomerated in a city. This implies 
^ t once a city acquires a comparative advantage in providing intermediary services, the advantages 
teed upon itself’ and more traders and intermediators wil] come to that city, making it more efficient in 
l ^ t = ! ^ ^ , n . Also, the fixed cost of transaction is lowered by the agglomeration of efficient 
mtermediators, making trading easier. 
More than 2,000 multinational companies have established their regional offices or subsidiaries in 
Hong Kong usmg theu- registered (Hong Kong) firms as springboards to conduct their logistics 
operation m Chma and other Asian countries (Enright，Scott, & 5 o d ; l I , 1997). ^ 
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renowned with long-standing reputations for openness and simplicity of operation, 
and deep knowledge of international operations. In this way, the agglomerations 
undoubtedly provide international and operational knowledge to those firms who need 
to manage their business in global markets. 
Hong Kong firms also act as conduits to those foreign firms intending to make 
business connections with China. The economies of Hong Kong and mainland China 
have developed close links in recent years.^^ In this way, multinational firms in Hong 
Kong will have ample opportunities to develop connections with the Chinese 
companies through their registered Hong Kong companies (Enright, Scott & Dodwell, 
1997). Like other local firms, one remarkable feature of the overseas Hong Kong 
firms is that they are staffed by local experts specialized in the development of 
business relationships with China and the rest of the world. The 1995 World 
Competitive Report ranked Hong Kong's senior management level third out of 46. 
The Hong Kong managers have on average ten years of experience in international 
business. Unsurprisingly, it is very easy to recruit many managers in Hong Kong who 
possess greater transnational experience in international business. This international 
business experience stems in part from the highly international activities of Hong 
Kong,s local firms as well as the dense concentration of overseas firms in Hong 
Kong. 
(3) Hong Kong as a Training Center for Foreign and Chinese Expatriates 
23 
_ s^ ofthe end of 1995，Mainland-backed firms registered in Hong Kong held assets valued at US $50 
^Uion^ More than 200 Chinese companies have already set up their regional representative offices in 
hlon| Kong to gain access to the world markets, and to attract foreign investors' interests to work 
jomtly with Chinese enterprises. 
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As mentioned earlier, the less sophisticated in-house training in Chinese enterprises 
has led to far-reaching consequences?^ In this regard, they have to upgrade the quality 
of human inputs by sending their technicians or mangers to Hong Kong firms for 
practical training so as to fill the discrepancy (Enright, Scott, & Dodwell，1997; 
Sung 1991). Hong Kong has earned the reputation ofbeing an international city where 
“East meets West", where Chinese managers can access a mixture of Chinese and 
Westem management philosophies and practices in Hong Kong enterprises. 
Traditionally, Hong Kong firms are renowned for professional in-house training for 
all human resources at the executive trainee and office-worker level. With the help of 
Hong Kong firms in their training strategies, Chinese firms provide more 
comprehensive programs to their employees and often send the high-potential trainees 
to overseas training. 
Hong Kong firms can also be used as secondment centers for those foreign expatriates 
who will prepare to work in China. Prior to actual assignment, foreign expatriates are 
sent to Hong Kong firms on a provisional term, such as half a year, to see how well 
they can adjust to Hong Kong circumstances. Because of the cultural lifestyle, 
managerial practices in Hong Kong are more analogous to western countries, and so 
foreign expatiate managers should not have so many difficulties in adjusting and 
working in Hong Kong firms. By instilling more factual information on Chinese 
culture and lifestyle and having more exposure to different cross-cultural situations, 
they are expected to report fewer troubles in long-term adjustment. Such training will 
24 In view of the seriousness of the situation, Chinese enterprises are eager to learn modernized 
management principles and manufacturing technology from the foreign IJV partners. Because of 
considerable technological/ managerial discrepancy, the Chinese enterprises alone may not be able to 
catch up with the required standards (Enright, Scott, & Dodwdl, 1997). 
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certainty lessen the expatriates' cross-cultural shock in China (Black, 1990; Tung, 
1986). Hong Kong firms can serve as international training assignment centers which 
provide foreign expatriates with the opportunity to prepare for cross-cultural 
encounters in China. 
(4) Hong Kong as Versatile Chinese Experts for Both Foreign and Chinese Firms 
As mentioned earlier, previous studies suggested that it is hard to recruit right 
interpreters who possess proficiency in both English and Chinese and are competent 
in business experience. Because of the close economic ties between China and Hong 
Kong firms, foreign firms should find it easier to find and recruit experts in Hong 
Kong who have good experience and connections with Chinese enterprises and 
officials and manage the negotiation process with Chinese managers. Not surprisingly, 
on the long-term basis, a number of foreign firms have considered forming a joint 
venture with Hong Kong based companies in order to fully utilize their local expertise 
in negotiation and management of Chinese enterprises and officials (Beamish & 
Wang, 1989; Mun & Chan, 1986). 
Also, foreign partners have much difficulty in applying foreign management styles in 
China. Hong Kong firms are more in flexible in their management strategies to suit 
mutual needs ofboth partners, hi many studies, Hong Kong mangers report the fewest 
problems in joint venture management because they are well-suited to both foreign 
and Chinese working standards. They share with the Chinese workers' culture, 
languages, and work ethic bond (Ireland, 1991; Stewert & Delisle, 1994). Definitely, 
under the mediating ofHong Kong firms, many adverse conflicts between foreign and 
Chinese enterprises may be resolved, developing an amicable atmosphere for mutual 
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understandings. 
(5) Hong Kong as a Source ofAvailability of Professional Firm 
Running a foreign-Chinese joint venture is particularly difficult for both foreign and 
Chinese partners. From the point of view of foreign investors, greater emphasis should 
be placed on a series of supporting services through various ways and means (Hsueh 
& Woo, 1986). As the pioneers participating in a variety of investments in the 
mainland since 1979, Hong Kong firms have accumulated valuable experience in 
China, and developed capabilities to offer many specialized intermediary services to 
foreign firms to facilitate their business in China. No other community has a deeper 
practical knowledge and clue ofhow to do and maintain business in China than Hong 
Kong firms (Chen, 1994; Enright, Scott & Dodwell, 1997). In this way, Hong Kong 
firms play a catalytic role in lowering the transaction costs offoreign firms, and hence 
facilitates the interaction of Chinese enterprises with the extemal world. They also act 
to provide business services and logistic hubs for both foreign investors and Chinese 
enterprises. Many Hong Kong law, accountancy and consulting firms, for instance, 
have an extensive network in China and offer many practical-on-ground help, advice 
and guidance to China trade (Enright, Scott & Dodwell，1997).^^ Through the 
enormous supporting services provided to foreign investors, Hong Kong firms have 
been contributing to the development of more high-powered cooperative management 
between foreign and Chinese IJVs. 
？' Srnig (1991) found that half of the foreign law firms in Hong Kong provided legal advice to foreign 
fvestors related to the China trade. Enright, Scott and Dodwell (1997) found that Hong Kong trading 
tirms possess many professional experts such as lawyers, and accountants who have deep knowledge of 
Mamland busmess and the Chinesejoint venture law, including the ins and outs ofdrawing up trading 
contracts with the Mainland, and the complexities of assessing Mainland companies 
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(6) Hong Kong as a Trading and Infrastructure Center of China Trade 
Strengthening the intra-economic cooperation will inevitably cause a rapid demand of 
infrastructure development. With the upsurge of the economic reforms in China, many 
Chinae infrastructure facilities have reached full capacity. This situation has been 
aggravated because ofChinese bureaucracy and shortage ofcapital in the extension or 
construction of new infrastructure.^^ 
To resolve these problems, many foreign firms search for Hong Kong trading firms to 
facilitate their business in China. Hong Kong is a free port with minimal restrictions 
on trade activities?^ With the development of more convenient, fast and reliable 
infrastructural facilities in the future, Hong Kong firms will become successful 
intermediaries of international trade in the near future. 
The existence of high standards of international communication facilities is essential . 
to both foreign and Chinese partners. However, the communication facilities in China 
lagged behind those in the advanced nations and do not meet the local demand, hi this 
regard, Hong Kong trading companies can provide complementary roles towards 
foreign partners since they are already been equipped with these advanced 
international communication facilities with virtually no restrictions. They can acquire 
the latest information from the advanced worldwide communication channels, then 
disseminate their foreign partners the news and information on the global and Chinese 
� T a k i n g container port as an example, many of the Chinese ports are small scale, less efficient and 
^ Z t 7 l ^ f T i factors like silting or seabed. In case of upsurge of exported goods by fordgn-
r ! f ^ f IJVs to foreign markets during peak seasons such as Christmas periods, those goods have to 
Z r J l L ^ ^ ^ t ， p r i o r to being transshipped to other destinations. Such an inefficient cargo 
operation has a negative influence on foreign-China trade relationship (Hong Kong Business 1993) 
J ^ ^ ^ ^ n � t five years the Hong Kong government will invest more than 30 million U.S. dollars m a 
ni^mbe� of massive infrastructure projects to strengthen the competitiveness of Hong Kong as an 
mtemational financial center in the long run (Hong Kong Business, 1993). 明 
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markets or political movements. 
Foreign firms also value Hong Kong firms as a market information and technology 
source. Ln China, the availability of mass multimedia is limited and often restricted by 
the Chinese authorities?^ Earlier identification on the latest economic, industrial and 
political news in China can be obtained from Hong Kong firms because of the 
proximity and the availability of reliable information networks (guanxi) among 
Chinese officials (Mun & Chan, 1986). In addition, Hong Kong trading firms can 
disseminate this information without any restrictions. In this way, foreign firms can be 
well prepared for the change in the Chinese policies and reduce political risks in 
advance. In this way, Hong Kong firms play a significant role in gathering of first-
hand information on China. 
Hong Kong as a Financier 
In this section, we discuss Hong Kong firms' leading role in syndicating loans and in 
foreign investment. By playing these roles, Hong Kong firms make significant 
contributions to the development of financial expertise among foreign-Chinese IJV. 
The technological structure among Chinese enterprise is very far behind the 
international standard (Sung, 1991; Woo & Huseh, 1991). In the past, price 
competition has been adopted i.e. Chinese enterprises mainly specialize in export-
onented activities in terms of massive volume of export to maintain the foreign-
exchange earnings for import payments (Lau, 1986).^ ^ 
28 
The available information outlet in China comes only from a few channels such as Xinhua News Agency 
H(^ever, Ae mformation disseminated by these official agencies may be biased (Mun & Chan 1986) 
1 akmg the shoe mdustry as an example, China has become the world's largest shoe rnanufacmrins as well 
as exporter m 1997 {FuzhuangShibao (Fashion News), October;9,1998} ^ weii 
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Although Chinese enterprises have succeeded to increasing the growth of exported 
volume, the terms of net marginal profits have progressively deteriorated (Woo & 
Huseh, 1991). Indeed, Chinese commodities are renowned for being cheap, higher in 
costs with low quality copies of package design. As a result, they fail to capture the 
internationally recognized quality, and hence cannot compete in the luxury market. 
This results in a market partition where foreign companies usually occupy the middle 
to high end whilst Chinese enterprises are squeezed into the low end segment. As time 
elapses，such partition is very unfavorable to national development of local private 
companies. Unless Chinese enterprises improve the quality to attract foreign buyers, it 
will be extremely difficult for them to enter into these networks once such a partition 
is formed. As long as the Chinese enterprises chronically occupy the low-end-knock-
offs, they will find hard to compete with foreign companies on the luxurious segments. 
Li the long run, they will lose the opportunities to capture far higher profits (Lau, 1986; 
Sung, 1991). 
One strategy suggested that Chinese enterprises can capture higher profits ifthey can 
well-utilize their existing infrastructure to produce higher cost, unique brands with 
greater quality and attractive designs.��However, Chinese manufacturers are doing 
opposite. Almost all Chinese manufacturers either copy or adapt foreign designs to cut 
costs. Few have been able to develop innovative and high-quality products of their 
own because they lack a well-developed design infrastructure (Fang, 1998)?' 
°^ With the emergence unique brands visible on the international stage, it is possible to achieve 
sustainable growth in the Chinese enterprises. Countries around the world have already many world 
3^ /ass competitive brands, for example, Toyota and Sony in Japan and Acer in Taiwan 
SixJy percent ofthe world wearing shoes "Made in China". Fuzhuang Shibao (Fashion News) 
October, 9，1998. 
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To cope with these situations, many Chinese enterprises readily form joint ventures 
with foreign enterprises, hoping that they can provide the fund-raising, design and 
technology how-know that China lacks. With advanced technology, they can create 
more value-added activities to transform low-value semi-manufactures into high-
priced attached products that can multiple their profits exponentially. As proposed 
earlier，the foreign-Chinese IJVs will face initial fund shortages. There is widespread 
shortage of capital among foreign-Chinese IJVs at the startup stage because the 
majority of the financial support is reserved exclusively for giant state-owned 
companies and the foreign-Chinese IJVs (Fang, 1998).32 They simply cannot raise the 
necessary amount of funds to compete in these companies since massive investments 
are needed to create a physical, human and technology infrastructural environment 
which is conducive to commercialization of unique premium brand. 
Aside from fund shortages, the development ofhigh-tech industries is very expensive 
and time-consuming and they are beginning to lose their profitability.^^ This will 
certainly put them into a disadvantageous position when competing with foreign and 
state-owned companies in the Chinese market. Under this rather unfavorable 
environment, their opportunities for growth are being lost; and finally there is a 
greater possibly for being entirely excluded from the Chinese environment. 
(1) Hong Kong Firms as the Leading Role in Syndicating Loans 
Hong Kong has solidified its position as a financial center. With the strong economic 
;;ibid ‘ 
33 Previous studies show that many foreign-Chinese IJVs usually start on a small scale by first 
operatmg on a low tech and capital basis such as textile, retailing and food in order to acoumilate 
capital, technological capacity and experience. 
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growth, the availability of foreign and Chinese experts and efficient commercial and 
subsidiaries in Hong Kong. The World Competitiveness Yearbook (1995) ranked 
institutional policies in Hong Kong, many foreign banks have set up their financial 
Hong Kong as the second in terms of the availability of venture capital for business 
development, following the United States. All the major multinational banks have 
branches in Hong Kong and, together with many financial organizations, provide a 
wide range offinancial services essential to trading activities. 
As mentioned above, many startup foreign-Chinese IJVs face the problems ofcapital 
shortage which is a major barrier to their survival. To increase the operational 
efficiencies, they should secure their commercial loans from local banks. However, 
they have found it difficult to meet the rules required by the local institutions because 
oflow creditability.^^ Hong Kong firms are potentially very useful to foreign-Chinese 
IJVs in fund-raising because Hong Kong firms can arrange syndicated loans or direct 
capital investment to the JVs (Sung, 1991). 
(2) Hong Kong Firm as an Investor 
At the very beginning, Hong Kong firms became one ofthe world's leading sources of 
foreign direct investment. Taking advantage of the lower labor costs and cheap natural 
resources, many Hong Kong investors have shifted their operations to other Southern 
Asian countries，particularly in China.^^ With the increased need for trade between 
China and other industrialized nations, Hong Kong firms have provided foreign-
34 WiA the increased conservatism on the credit expansion after the debt crisis in recent years it is 
moreWcely for these local financial institutions to tighten the lending limit to these ventures The recent 
^ ' ^ has mevitably aggravated the financial constraints for both the short-and long -term growth ofthe 
i-J V b* 
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Chinese IJVs with numerous opportunities to compete with the foreign and state-
owned companies in China. 
Hong Kong Firm as a Packager and Integrator 
Hong Kong has a comparative advantage in the packaging and integrating business. 
Despite its relatively small economy with paucity of natural resources, Hong Kong 
firms still preserve their competitiveness. This is because many Hong Kong firms 
possess the ability to package and integrate inputs from diverse sources in foreign 
countries, and constantly work to identify new sources of supply to create high-valued 
products at a premium price. By incorporating a series ofdistinctive features ofHong 
Kong firms into the strategic formulation by foreign-Chinese IJVs, the IJVs can 
combine the complementary advantages possessed by both the foreign and Chinese 
partners. In the following sections, we will describe how the presence of the Hong 
K:ong partner will contribute to the performance offoreign-Chinese IJVs. Specifically, 
we focus on two factors underlying the competitive advantage of Hong Kong firms: 
the technology propensity and the packaging and integration capacity. 
The Chinese partners may lack the skills to acquire the foreign partners' proprietary 
knowledge. The existence of cultural and technological gaps between the two partners 
fUrther aggravates the difficulty of inter-partner learning. A few foreign-Chinese IJVs 
have consolidated and expanded in order to achieve more efficient production. While 
it is possible to create products with similar appearance and ingredients, their qualities 
2 r l7oy =^1,995’ Hong Kong was the fourth world leader m outwards foreign direct investment, but 
over 80 /o ofthe mvestment is concentrated in China (Enright, Scott, & DodwelI, 1997). 
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are still very far behind that of place of origin.^^ Davidson (1987) attributes this 
phenomenon to the impact of customers' orientation a particular type of product. He 
argues that there is a generalized perception of considerable difference between the 
local and foreign-made products since Chinese customers tend to regard the foreign-
Chinese IJVs products as inferior domestic-made items compared to those similar 
items imported from the developed countries such as Japan and the USA. 
Technological Propensity-On the technological development front, with a few 
exceptions, the technology quality of foreign-Chinese IJVs lags very far behind that of 
foreign companies (Enright, Scott & Dodwell, 1997; Lau, 1986; Woo & Huseh, 1991). 
However, it is argued that new technology can only be accumulated on the top of 
existing technology base (Suda, 1994). To achieve the most advanced technological 
standard among foreign-Chinese IJVs, it is necessary to make huge investments for 
R& D. Faced with substantial financial constraints, however, a foreign-Chinese IJV 
has little choice but to imbibe the necessary middle-level technology to innovate the 
newly acquired products or to apply it to produce high-quality goods at a lower price. 
Li this respect, Hong Kong firms can play a significant role in technology acquisition 
and application within foreign-Chinese IJVs. Through the technology imported from 
Hong Kong firms, the foreign-Chinese IJVs can make the manufacturing process 
more capital and technology intensive. 
36 Taking Shiseido cosmetic company as an example, a well-known product line named "Aupreus" is a 
� l e s ofcosmetic products based on the in-depth cooperative research by a Beijing technological 
=^elopmei^t company. Although their products are sold at lower price, it is hard for them to compete 
wim mtemational competitors (Fang, 1998). 
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Listead of creating the current research and technology investment, Hong Kong firms 
excel in gaining profits primarily by scanning the existing worldwide technologies and 
aggregating them into their production process. Foreign-Chinese IJVs continuously 
absorb high-quality technology at a relatively low-cost from Hong Kong partners. 
Through the technology transfer from Hong Kong partners, foreign-Chinese IJVs can 
speed up their technology criterion within a short time and broaden the products scope 
at a lower cost to fulfill the need ofthe large customer base in China.]? 
Flexible Response in Their Strategies-Tht inability to cope with foreign demand is a 
major shortcoming among foreign-Chinese IJVs. Many foreign-IJVs are plagued by 
substantial oversupply problem. It is hard for the foreign-Chinese IJV. The unique 
strengths of Hong Kong firms are the flexibility in responding speedily to fast-
changing, fashion-driven demand and the capabilities to interpret consumer trends in 
major foreign markets.^^ With the collaboration of Hong Kong firms, superfluous 
stocks ofproducts can be reintegrated and packaged into their style ofbrand identities 
and sold in their retailing shops. Undoubtedly, the leverage of Hong Kong firms in 
foreign-Chinese IJVs, strategy formulation will be a worthwhile investment so as to 
tackle their weakness and develop synergies for their further development. 
Packaging and Integration CajmM^-Mmy Hong Kong firms have the world-class 
capability of design and packaging. With this capability, they can foster the high 
L l Z n r . T f ^ A V ? Computf (Hong Kong) company, the world leader in educational electronics, 
= c S r t f e � ± P a = . Specific Integrated Circuits (ASICs) into the production and assembled 
g^ocess to economize their expenditure on research developments 
For example, many Hong Kong firms produce thousands ofdifferent designs ofwatches to satisfy the 
^ n g m g consumer tastes in the world watch industries. Moreover, many Hong h n r m a n u ^ = f r ^ 
c h Z n Z t " ^ " ^ thei" own-brand products, such as Goldlion and Giordano, and s o ? d \ = S ^ o g h � 
cham of theu- own retailmg shops in China. ^ 
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value-added activities of design input. A Hong Kong firm can help a foreign-Chinese 
IJV to design the product concept, organize the production plan, purchase necessary 
components and raw materials, manufacture the final goods on time, and meet the 
stringent quality control and customer needs in the international market.^^ Moreover, 
Hong Kong export traders have developed numerous informal business networks with 
factories and traders across Asia and other western countries. These networks offer 
Hong Kong traders the expertise in providing different packaging designs to meet 
different customers' needs. 
Given their long experience of understanding international customers' tastes 
especially for fashion-related manufacturing items such as garments, watches, or toys, 
Hong Kong firms can offer unrivaled information on future trends in fashion items to 
foreign-Chinese IJVs. This skill allows foreign-Chinese IJVs to meet the fastest 
changes in market demand, keeping ahead of other competitors in international 
markets. Thus, Hong Kong firms can foster more value-added activities to foreign-
Chinese IJVs. 
Hong Kong as a Trading Partner 
Since the adoption of the open-door policy in the 1980s, China provides an unity for 
foreign firms to explore the largest emerging market potential (Shenkar, 1990).^ ^ 
After the implementation of the open-door policy, foreign firms have become very 
aggressive in searching forjoint-venture partners in China. Some foreign firms prefer 
^ A ^ ^ indu|try, for example Hong Kong producers have dominated the low-end of the world's 
^ , ¾ c u s ^ on the changing consumer tastes with very rapid production and d1li=ry c y i L 
N ^ t s ! p S t l , f9r9freign companies in retail and distribution. Xinmm Wanbao Qanmin Evening 
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to have a Hong Kong firm as a "third partner" in their JVs in China because the Hong 
Kong partner facilitates the trade (both import and export) ofthe JVs. In the following 
sections, we discuss why the presence of a Hong Kong partner can facilitate the trade 
of the foreign-Chinese JVs. 
(1) Hong Kong as a Supply Source of Commodities-Domestic Export to China 
Acquiring a stable and high-quality raw material supply is a complex and tough task 
for foreign-Chinese IJVs. In China, many foreign partners prefer to import from 
foreign countries to satisfy their domestic demands. However, the government will 
exclusively control the demand for imported goods, and many measures have already 
been enacted to restrict imports so as to restore balance oftrade (Sung，1991; Woo & 
Huseh, 1991). The consequence of such a policy will further constrain the supply of 
raw material from foreign partners. The chronic supply ofraw materials shortage has 
undoubtedly elevated the price of foreign imported goods, and hence further 
reinforced the difficulties of satisfying local demands. In such an environment, 
pursuing the local sourcing may be the best option as it can reduce the unnecessary 
spending on foreign exchange and build up an amicable relationship with local 
suppliers. However, the quality and reliability ofChinese suppliers are not guaranteed 
and often lag far behind the foreign partners' requirements. Even when the local 
suppliers' quality are reliable, the delivery time is questioned (Davidson, 1987).^ ^ 
To tackle this problem, cooperation with a Hong Kong firm becomes essential 
41 The efFicient local supply may also be exacerbated by the complicated Chinese bureaucracv which 
= o s e s a barner to the raw material supply chaanel. To resolve these problems the = = 2 h 7 n : s 3 
I jys have to cultivate deeper and closer personal relationship (guaJi) w i r c i i ^ e r e ^ ^ i ^ L s : 
r e l ^ c e route to obtam raw materials and other items that are i ! s h o r t ) s _ y i ( t e l P a ^ = L 
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because it can offer an opportunity to a foreign-Chinese IJV who is keen to exploit 
and maintain a stable source of raw material supply in the Chinese market. Because of 
its great operational knowledge in China and an amicable network of informal 
relationships with Chinese suppliers, a Hong Kong firm partner enables the foreign-
Chinese IJV to maintain an on-time, stable delivery schedule (Emight, Scott & 
Dodwell, 1997; Stewart & Delisle, 1994; Xin & Pearce, 1996). 
A Hong Kong firm is also an important source of supply for the Chinese partners of 
the foreign-Chinese IJVs. As more and more foreign-Chinese IJVs are established, 
demand for the raw material supply is rapidly increasing (Davidson, 1987).42 A Hong 
Kong firm is used to be more sensitive and flexible in face of foreign-Chinese IJVs' 
demands. The increased share ofHong Kong's domestic exports to China (see Table 8) 
manifests this. In particular, Hong Kong firms' manufactured consumer goods, tools, 
light machines and equipment are more likely to satisfy the needs and desire of 
foreign-Chinese IJVs than the goods from the west. But most important, Hong Kong 
firms' exports are more affordable to the purchasing capability of foreign-Chinese 
IJVs (Sung, 1991). 
Another remarkable trend is the increased import of semi-manufactured items such as 
garments from Hong Kong firms as an intermediate input for the foreign-Chinese IJVs 
in the outward processing trade.^^ As a result, they can concentrate the available 
resources on exploring and maintaining advanced technology in order to produce 
42 Responding to the insufficient supply in domestic markets. China has been lessening the importation 
constraints for the light consumer goods and industrial raw materials such as textile fabrics and 
dectronic components for the production of clothing and consumer electronics (Sun^ 1991) 
The drect purchasing of such items is great advantage especially for smalllnd medium-sized 
toreign-Chmese IJVs because they can invest less (time and capital) in the entire production and 
assemblmg process. ^ 
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consistently high-quality products at a lower cost. By focusing on such advanced 
technology, it is possible to convert these semi-manufactured inputs into high-valued 
products which can be charged at a premium price. Apart from this advantage, cost 
efficiency is enhanced through direct purchasing from Hong Kong firms that can 
remove the need to pay other agents during the transaction (Duncan, 1997). As Hong 
Kong firms are renowned for innovative and rigorous quality control in the production 
process, direct purchasing of semi-manufactured goods from Hong Kong firms allow 
them to absorb the technology and design embodied in their products. 
(2) Hong Kong as Consumer of Chinese Goods 
From the view of the Hong Kong market, Chinese merchandisers have been 
competing poorly. This is mainly attributed to the fact that Chinese products compete 
on the basis of low prices rather than quality (Lau, 1986; Sung, 1991). Gauging the 
advantages in price flexibility and high-quality products processed by a Hong Kong 
frnn, many foreign-Chinese IJVs tend to have a Hong Kong firm as a third JV partner. 
Probably, the most important contribution of the Hong Kong firm is to build up the 
customer's loyalty, which reinforces the sales of foreign-Chinese IJVs in China.^^ 
Hong Kong firms can foster the foreign-Chinese IJVs to establish oftheir premium 
brand in a fast and efficient way. In fact, some major Hong Kong firms, such as 
Goldlion and Giordano, have already developed their own brand names and well-
arranged distribution channels in China. With a strong public image in China, most 
44 Traditionally, Chinese customers are attached to particular brands because oftheir orkins rather than 
the quaity o f the products (Emght, Scott & Dodwell, 1997). From Chinese t h e S JustLers ' 
perspective, products from foreign-Chinese IJVs are typically regarded as inferior to imported brand 
products even thoughthe quality ofthe products is better (Davidson, 1987). As a result a growing 
gm^ber ofpeople m^hrna prefer to purchase imported brands, rather than to those products produced 
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Chinese customers regard many Hong Kong firm-made products as the most highly 
desirable and superior. Thus, foreign-Chinese IJVs can utilize these channels to build 
up their own premium brands. 
Hong Kong as Middleman 
As a result of China's open door policy, Hong Kong's entrepot trade with China has 
made a remarkable growth during the period of 1994 to 1997. This growth surpasses 
the domestic exports. The dramatic growth of the re-export trade in Hong Kong is a 
direct consequence of China's resurgence in the world marketplace and the massive 
outward processing trade activities, especially in the Pearl River Delta of Southern 
Province (Hong Kong Business, 1993; Soesastro, 1994).45 Hong Kong firms play the 
important roles as middlemen in the commodity and services trade in Asian Pacific 
region. 
Significance of Entprepot Trade (Re-export)-Sim^ly speaking, the emergence of 
themiddleman is due to two conditions (1) the political constraint and (2) the strategic 
location combined with an efficient transporation system. Despite the benefit and 
improvement on direct trade with China, certain factors such as infrastructure 
constraints are still hindrances.^^ To facilitate trade development, Hong Kong 
intermediary firms particularly need to counteract the insufficient infrastructure in 
China. Since Hong Kong firms are specialized in providing intermediary trading 
45 As for geographical distribution in trade (see Tables 9 and 10), China's re-export trade has increased 
dramatically from 1996 to 1997. China has always been the main source ofHong Kong's entrepot trade 
whilst the second largest source now is Japan, followed by Taiwan. 
4 Rapid growth oftrade between China and various countries has driven the demand of infrastructure 
facilities and services such as transportation and communication to handle trade-related business in 
China. 
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services for the provision of efficient processing and transshipment of goods, cost 
effectiveness is enhanced through the mediation of Hong Kong traders so as to lower 
transaction costs arising from the cultural heterogeneity and monopoly power (Sung, 
1991). 
Equally significantly, political constraints may also lead to the demand for the 
middlemen to offset foreign partners' political risk, particularly for those with no 
diplomatic relations with China. Since official direct trade is strongly prohibited by 
the Taiwanese government, the only feasible way is to re-export through Hong 
Kong's peculiar political position. In such circumstances, those independent minded 
Taiwanese firms can just simply establish their regional Hong Kong subsidiaries as 
middlemen to conduct any trade investments in China. As these investments, their 
registered Hong Kong companies have often initiated such as outwards processing 
operations or importation, it is possible for Taiwanese companies to evade the trade 
restrictions with China. 
The Prospect ofthe Hong Kong Firm as Middleman-li is realized that the role of 
Hong Kong in China's commodities has shifted from that of a consumer of Chinese 
goods to that of a middleman and a supplier of goods to China. The quantify of 
Chinese goods consumed in Hong Kong is still large, but the market is close to 
saturation. Unless Chinapan improve the quality of its exports or dlVersify its exports 
rapidly，the Chinese share of the Hong Kong market will stagnate or even decline. 
However, it is obvious that the role for Hong Kong has shifted from that of a 
consumer of Chinese exports to that of a processor of Chinese goods for export to the 
world market. Such a Hong Kong firm probably plays a significant intermediary role 
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in promoting the interflow of trade and capital investment between various foreign 
countries and China (Sung, 1991). As the Chinese commodity trade will shift towards 
less bulky and more heterogeneous goods, this increased demand of intermediation 
may cause more foreign Chinese IJVs to be more dependent on Hong Kong firms for 
investment, loans and exported promotion. At present, many Chinese import and 
export companies compete with Hong Kong firms, but it was found that only those 
companies in Shanghai are capable of challenging the position of Hong Kong in 
intermediation because of considerably backward transportation and communication 
facilities elsewhere. In addition, the Chinese companies are establishing many trading 
companies in Hong Kong, hoping to attract morejoint venture contracted investment. 
The economies of agglomeration of many Chinese trading companies in Hong Kong 
further heightens the position ofHong Kong firms as middlemen. 
Summary 
To sum up, global expansion involves the establishing of significant operations and 
market interests outside a company's home country. One of the competitive 
advantages is transferring core skill such as technological, management and 
marketing skills local competitors typically lack, allowing multinational firms to eam 
greater retums from the existing skills and know-how. However, the choice of the 
manufacturing operation site is a painful decision for many global and multinational 
companies. Caught between a desire to attract the cost factors of production such as 
labor and raw material inputs on the one hand, and the availability of certain skills, 
particularly skilled labor on the other hand, the multinational company has to 
reconcile these contrasting forces. China may be the best option among other 
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destinations. By doing so, a company invested in China may be able to lower the cost 
of value creation and perform key value-creation functions in a way that results in 
greater differentiation and a premium price. 
However, many global and multinational companies seemed to run into many 
p r o b l e m s . 4 7 One possible option is to customize the local responsiveness in China by 
alignment or cooperation or seek aid with Hong Kong firms in the foreign-Chinese 
IJVs. Indeed, Hong Kong firms can play an intermediary role by lowering the 
transactional costs of China trade. Hong Kong firm is qualified to provide 
intermediary services because of its unique intrinsic factors and external factors such 
as the its free and efficient structure. Hong Kong firms can greatly lessen the arising 
between foreign-Chinese IJVs. By establishing credible commitments, it is possible to 
support the long-term relationship between foreign-Chinese IJVs and performance. As 
I have seen, Hong Kong and its firms have taken many economic roles. General 
speaking, we affirm that there are four pivotal roles that it has played in the foreign-
Chinese IJVs: the facilitator, financier, trading partner and middleman. The first role 
is as facilitator: it can promote the foreign and China trade by either offering 
professional expertise, advice, investments and indication of contact point due to the 
agglomeration of trading firms in Hong Kong. By the evolution of more forefront 
professional expertise and business hubs for overseas and Chinese companies, it is 
certainly a significant driving force for promoting China trade with other foreign 
partners. Shigeo (1995) argued that Japanese and other foreign companies might well 
utilize Hong Kong's efficient infrastructure, business and personal connection with 
47 Because of the unique political, economic and cultural environment in China that are ^reatIv 
confrasts .those m westem countries, these special characteristics make IJVs oarticularlv 
problematic(Ralston, Gustafson，Cheung L Terpstra, 1992; Shenkar, 1990) s particularly 
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the mainland China as a hedge against risks involved in direct investment in China. 
Thus, teaming up with a Hong Kong firm in a foreign-Chinese JV will heighten the 
foreign firm's bargaining position over the local Chinese partner (Beamish & Wang, 
1989; Leung & Yeung, 1995; Pan, 1996), and enable the foreign firm to gain more 
benefits from the investment (Pan, 1996). 
The second role is as financier: it can act as the foremost investor and the leader in 
the commercial loan for the foreign-Chinese IJVs. Also, in this process, Hong Kong 
firms engage in the global trend in outwards processing activities, dispersing their 
manufacturing process to far-flung regions particularly in China. In that way, Hong 
Kong firms emerge into a broader, integrated economy encompassing Mainland 
China. The third role delineate the trading partners of Hong Kong firm in which is 
responsible for supplying import and export source of commodities to and from the 
foreign-Chinese IJVs. It is possible for them to manufacture or integrate various high-
tech inputs from Hong Kong partners into a high-quality output which can multiply 
their profitability exponentially. Hong Kong also emerges as a well-positioned 
middleman playing an important role as an intermediator for entrepot trade and 
interaction between various destinations especially for those who have no direct trade 
or other dorms of commercial or official contact with China. Instead, Hong Kong or 
its firms may act as a springboard for China investment so that they can extend their 
trade with other economies. 
Li short, in view of successful intermediators between China and other destinations, it 
is necessary for Hong Kong to encompass many essential trade and commercial 
factors, such as location, convenient transportation, fast and reliable communication, 
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sufficient local information, finance and resources. As the Asia-Pacific regions will 
maintain a robust and attractive economy, the position of Hong Kong as an 
international financial center in this region will be ever more important in future. Li 
particular, the economic and social trade exchanges between Hong Kong and 
mainland China have increased steadily (see Table 4). However, the economic and 
cultural systems in China are quite different from those in the Western communities. 
Thus, Hong Kong firms perhaps play a role of intermediation for interconnecting the 
economic and social-cultural systems between China and other western countries in 
the Far East region especially for China trade. This has allowed Hong Kong and its 
firms a unique role in the world economy which will be more important in the future. 
Table 11 
A Summary of the Problems and the Role of the Hong Kong 
Firm Promoting the Japanese-Chinese IJVs 
Mernal factors: Facilitator 1. As a local conduit/gateway to local market 
(1) Cultural difference 2. As a location for different kinds of firms 
(2) Language barrier (i) As a training center for foreign and 
(3) Incompatible cross- Chinese expatriates 
cultural negotiation (ii) Providing versatile Chinese experts for 
(4) Licompatible both foreign and Chinese firms 
management style 3. Hong Kong firm: a source of availability of 
professional firm 
External factors: 4. A complementary role of trading and 
(5) Foreign exchange infrastructure center to China trade 
shortage oflJV Financier 1. The leading role in syndicating loans 
(6) Lack of strong 2. The role in foreign investment 
technology Trading 1. Hong Kong as a supply source of 
(7) Inadequate Partner commodities-domestic export to China 
infrastructure 2. Circumventing barriers in trade 
support 3. Hong Kong as consumer of Chinese goods 
Middleman 1. Overcoming the political constraint 





These preceding arguments lead us to expect that the role of Hong Kong firms will be 
advantageous in the facilitation of China trade with other destinations especially 
when the economic and foreign trade between China and other destinations become 
more frequent and complex. The literature suggests that familiarity and interfirm 
diversity are two key factors for performance (Beamish & Inkpen, 1995; Parkhe, 
1991). In the following, we particularly underline the function of the intermediary 
role of Hong Kong firms in facilitating foreign firms to make business with China, 
based on the argument previously mentioned. 
Strategic behavior differs across nations (Schnedier & Meyer, 1991). Thus, it is 
believed that different cultural assumptions and interpretations may be the primary 
reason to trigger off various responses on decision process and strategic behavior 
(Hofstede, 1980; Schneider, 1989). Stening and Hammer (1992) indicated that 
Japanese and American mangers differed in managerial practices in communicating 
effectively and in developing satisfying relationships in foreign culture. This implies 
that a firm's country origin affects its behavior (Kogut & Singh, 1988; Pan, 1996; 
Parkhe, 1991). Typically, the greater the cultural distance, the greater the uncertainty 
of managing ajoint venture in an extreme location, which probably drives some firms 
to impose more operational procedure onto their local partners. This is particularly 
true when foreign firms have little knowledge and confidence in local management. 
Given the above argument, when two parent firms with different backgrounds 
implement an international joint venture, misunderstanding inevitability arises, which 
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may be more likely to disrupt the cooperative relations (Adler, 1986). In fact, 
"interfirm diversity" can severely impede the commitment of both partners to work 
effectively (Harrigan 1988). Unless they have acquired the necessary skills to cope 
with their differences, a high failure rate is occurred (Shenkar, 1990). 
The importance of "familiarity" is a crucial factor to dominate the performance of 
JVs. Familiarity with foreign location expedite MNCs in establishing and managing 
foreign subsidiaries because it can reduce the cost and uncertainty while operating in 
a foreign market. Newbound, Buckley and Turwell (1978) found that small British 
MNCs were more successful in foreign expansion when they were more familiar with 
foreign markets. Davidson (1980) observed that the most common strategic plan 
deployed by US MNCs was the foreign expansion in the nearby foreign markets and 
subsequently in more culturally distant and unfamiliar markets. Because of this 
advantage, such a strategy can offset some undesirable factors, such as being 
unfamiliar to that region, which may impede their performance. 
Given the impact of familiarity and intefirm diversity on the performance of IJVs, 
foreign-firms will increase their investments abroad through cooperating with another 
foreign firm to reduce the level of uncertainty and transactional cost stemming from 
either the lack of familiarity or the interfirm diversity, or the both. Judging from the 
above argument, it may not be an appealing option to let the Chinese firms be the sole 
partners in the cooperative arrangement, particularly for those foreign firms who have 
little operational experience and know-how about the local partners. This is 
manifested by enormous performance problems when foreign firms operate joint 
ventures with Chinese enterprises in China (Shenkar, 1990). 
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It is argued that local Chinese enterprises have excellent market knowledge. For 
instance, they have a higher level of connections with local government officials and 
policy, and greater access to particular resources in China than foreign firms. As such, 
they are also the immediate source of local knowledge which can complement the 
foreign firms' location-based disadvantage. Although "local familiarity" is a crucial 
factor to account for better performance, other factors should be considered to 
achieve a satisfactory performance. However, as mentioned earlier, Chinese 
enterprises have often failed to provide their foreign-partners with firm-specific 
advantages, such as provision of good knowledge of English, familiarity with the 
modern business professional services, and the ability to work with different cultural 
partners. In addition, as mentioned earlier, the interfirms diversity is more acute in 
foreign-Chinese partnership than foreign-Hong Kong partnership. For instance, it is 
argued that the discrepancy of cultural differences between foreign and Chinese firms 
is much greater vis-a-vis foreign and Hong Kong firms. This implies that it is unsafe 
for Japanese firms to conduct business transaction with Chinese firms independently 
in view ofthe greater discrepancy in cultural values. Tse, Francis and Walls (1994) 
found that Canadian executives perceived Chinese firms as being more difficult to 
deal with as compared to another Canadian firms, for both personal and task-related 
conflicts. This could be a primary reason why foreign firms prefer to form alliances 
with other foreign firms rather than with local Chinese firms when doing business in 
China. Due to these unique problems, foreign-Chinese IJVs are much difficult to 
manage. 
It should be noted that, when starting business in China, foreign firms may prefer to 
form a JV with other non-Chinese (i.e., other foreign) firms with similar cultural and 
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social backgrounds. However, since these non-Chinese (other foreign) partners also 
possess location-based disadvantages in China, the JV formation with other foreign 
partners would not always lower the transactional risks in China. Hong Kong firms 
may be the best choice among the list of non-Chinese partners because Hong Kong 
firms have certain advantages in China that firms with other countries of origin do 
not possess (Redding, 1990). Many researchers, including Redding (1990) have 
pointed out the role of Hong Kong firms as local experts for foreign firms doing 
business in China. Also, Hong Kong firms' expertise, unique geographical position, 
and cultural and business ties to China make them ideal partners for cooperative 
arrangements. Hong Kong firms are regarded as effective tools to lower the 
transaction costs in China by offering foreign partners practical advice and 
management services which can complement the deficiency in their local knowledge 
in China. Given their limitations, such as being unfamiliar to marketing services, the 
foreign firms can make use of a Hong Kong firm as an intermediary in their JVs with 
local Chinese firms to flight for more privilege and autonomy. 
Hong Kong firms also took earlier advantages in establishing opportunities with 
Chinese officials and thereby creating an extensive interpersonal network. They have 
already accumulated invaluable local knowledge, which is manifested by massive 
investment particularly in outwards processing activities in China during the past few 
decades. On the other hand, as discussed earlier, the interfirm diversity between 
foreign (Japanese and western) and Hong Kong firms is much smaller than that of 
between foreign and Chinese firms. This implies that the foreign and Hong Kong 
partners are subjected to less managerial complexity in IJV management issue, 
thereby facilitating the formulation, development and collaborative effectiveness/ 
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contribution ofIJVs, effectiveness (Beamish & Inkpen, 1995). 
Hong Kong firms' expertise, knowledge and connections in China make them more 
desirable intermediaries for foreign firms than are Chinese firms. The benefit of 
alignment of Hong Kong firms' contribution of management and Chinese market 
knowledge should exceed those of Chinese enterprises. Thus, Hong Kong firms may 
be an appealing option to facilitate foreign investors' direct investment in China. On 
this basis, we hypothesized that: 
H1: Japanese-Hong Kong IJVs are more likely to attain better 
performance than Japanese-Chinese IJVs. 
When Japanese firms invest in a foreign location, they usually choose joint ventures 
so as to leam new skills and share risk and resources. Despite the surge in their 
popularity, a high failure rate is noted, which provides a strong indication that joint 
ventures are more difficult to manage (Shenkar, 1990), perhaps because of the 
disagreement and dissatisfaction over the management which occur between of 
different partners (Killing, 1983). Particularly, Japanese firms have a much higher 
level of uncertainty avoidance than firms from other countries of origin (see Table 5). 
As Japanese firms have a relatively high tendency and tradition to establish JVs with 
affiliated firms or unaffiliated firms in their overseas investment (Makino & Beamisli, 
1995), they are advised to cooperate with another foreign firm in lessening the impact 
of "interfirm diversity". As emphasized by previous studies, there are significant 
benefits in cooperation among foreign, Hong Kong and Chinese firms. The 
intermediary role of Hong Kong firms can not only mediate the interorganizational 
conflict，but also promote the mutual commitment to cooperation, which is necessary 
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to support enduring IJV relationships with higher performance. Particularly, the 
elements of Hong Kong's unique combinations can reinforce each other, making their 
coordination more flexible and resilient. Specifically, Hong Kong firms can offer a 
wide range of vital professional intermediary services to supplement many 
professional service or market information that foreign and Chinese partners lack. For 
instance, Hong Kong firms facilitate a Chinese partner's understanding and leaming 
of a foreign partner's advanced management and technological expertise. For foreign 
partners, Hong Kong firms play a key role as a local conduit/getaway to the local 
market. Therefore, those IJVs formed by alignment of Hong Kong firms are regarded 
as a safer way of smoothing the integration of both party's complementary strengths, 
and thus sustaining their competitive advantage than other partners from other 
countries especially when the foreign firms are facing the unprecedented challenges in 
China. 
Nonetheless, the contribution of Chinese enterprises cannot be underrated. As 
mentioned earlier, Chinese firms are more familiar with the domestic environment 
than are Hong Kong firms in terms of market knowledge. For example, they already 
possess some basic connections and industrial and marketing standards. The foreign 
firms can utilize such existing advantages in building up their scales of operation in a 
short interval. Di addition, most Chinese enterprises may possess strong political 
power to intervene with government policy in bargaining for more special privileges 
in the cooperative arrangement; for instance, allowing the foreign investors to set up 
JVs in key industries. Geringer (1991) suggested that additional benefits such as 
performance can be accrued from the alignment of symmetrical partners in the 
formation and operations of IJVs during the partner selection process since partners 
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with similar cultural backgrounds helps to determine the mix of skills and resources, 
operating policies and procedures, and overall competitive viability of an IJV. As long 
as the foreign, Hong Kong, and Chinese partners can resolve their interfirm diversity, 
they can cooperate enthusiastically with each other in international transactions and 
investments. Not only do three partners complement each other, but they also balance 
each other's deficiencies to enable a large and growing performance. Judging from 
this cooperative arrangement, we argue that a higher level of performance is probably 
attained for Japanese-Hong Kong-Chinese IJVs than those only with Japanese-
Chinese IJVs. Therefore, we have the following hypotheses: 
H2: Japanese-Hong Kong-Chinese IJVs attain better performance 
than Japanese-Chinese IJVs 
Comparison of IJVs，Performance in Non-metropolita n Regions 
against Metropolitan Regions : Do Hong Kong Firms Really Help the 
Japanese and Chinese IJVs 
In the previous session, we suggest that Hong Kong firms can assist foreign firms to 
foster their IJV performance in China. In this section, we compare various IJVs 
combination in the metropolitan regions and non-metropolitan regions by exploring a 
relationship between performance expectation and interpartner diversity, local 
familiarity and government support. 
Managing a better IJV performance in China is not an easy task, particularly when 
parent firms face the enormous inter-provincial diversity in term of sociocultural, 
political and economical indicators across different site (Hu & Chen, 1993; Shan, 
1991; Shenkar, 1990). However, many foreign enterprises may not realize, and even 
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underestimate the complexity associated with interpartner diversity and local 
familiarity, resulting in a higher incidence of performance instability and premature 
joint venture termination, particularly in non-metropolitan regions (Hu & Chen，1993; 
Shenkar, 1990). 
Interpartner diversity is often regarded as a crucial cause of IJV instability, particularly 
in an unfamiliar territory, which is dissimilar from those of their home country 
environment of most foreign firms. The challenge to foreign investor is, therefore, 
how to pursuit appropriate investment strategy in order to succeed under peculiar 
conditions of diverse political and economic systems. However, foreign expatriates in 
China are often unfamiliar with Chinese management practices at the inception of 
Chinese investment. Such foreign expatriates' unfamiliarity with local conditions is 
likely to precipitate the risk of misunderstandings and jeopardize the chance of 
financial success in the joint venture. 
Compared with other regions, metropolitan regions such as Beijing, Guangdong, 
Shanghai and Tianjian have traditionally been the prime locations for foreign 
investment in China (see Table 13). As a pioneer of foreign direct investment in China, 
many Japanese enterprises have been actively invested in China, particularly in 
metropolitan regions (Pan & Tse,1996). As Japanese firms have acquired local 
knowledge with regard to marketing system, politics and culture in metropolitan 
regions, they have been able to offset the disadvantages of being "non-residents", and 
hence the impact of interpartner diversity with such as societal and managerial 
differences with Chinese partners have decreased. From the perspective of Chinese 
partner, the Chinese partners in the metropolitan regions are somewhat different from 
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those in non-metropolitan regions, particularly those local Chinese firms which have 
already reaped from the long-term cooperative incentives through partnership with 
Japanese firms, showing greater understanding on the Japanese partner's cultural and 
managerial practices. In this way, Japanese and Chinese joint venture partners 
promote mutual understanding, while mitigating the possible conflict stemming from 
having a JV partner with different national background. As a result, it will potentially 
eliminate a major source of pre-mature performance instability. In addition, 
metropolitan regions are more economically developed and possess a larger pool of 
human resources and more impeccable infrastructure to support their business 
operations than non-metropolitan regions. Meanwhile, the metropolitan governments 
have shown the most enthusiastic and receptive attitudes and actively proliferated 
many liberal regional priorities such as tax concessions to attract foreign investment. 
Further, business environments in these areas are more similar to the environment of 
most Japanese firms (i.e. Japan) than the rest of other Chinese provinces. As a matter 
of fact, these favorable conditions in the metropolitan regions will help Japanese 
investors to disperse investment risk, expediting their adjustment and operation in 
these areas (Hu & Chen, 1993; Pan, 1996). In sum, Japanese-Chinese IJVs operating 
in metropolitan regions are more likely to yield better performance than those IJVs in 
non-metropolitan regions. Taken together, we have the following hypothesis: 
H3a: Japanese-Chinese IJVs would attain better performance 
in metropolitan regions than in non-metropolitan regions. 
As mentioned above, local familiarity and interpartner diversity have played a 
significant impact on IJV performance. In this section, we examine the impact of 
government policy on IJV performance. 
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Since the inception of open-door policy in 1980, many non-metropolitan governments 
have been granted with authorities to implement foreign investment policy. As a 
typical of any large developing economies, however, China suffers from unevenness 
in economic development. It is found that the pace of “openness，，varies from one 
region to another. In order to propel their provincial growth, many non-metropolitan 
governments have to rely on the state-owned companies, and hence endorse a series of 
privileges, which are reserved exclusively for these state-owned companies. In non-
metropolitan regions, localized state-owned companies have therefore built 
advantages in the local market. Perhaps for this reason, government officials in non-
metropolitan regions are much conservative and still not eager to promulgate more 
liberal policies in allowing foreign companies to enter their economy, particularly in 
partner selection in IJVs (Beamish, 1993; Pan, 1996; Shan, 1991). 
Indeed, the provincial governments prefer to include at least one localized Chinese 
firm in IJV alignment (Beamish, 1993; Pan & Tse, 1996). The incongruence ofthe 
interest of the non-metropolitan government with that of the Japanese-Hong Kong 
IJVs often results in more restriction and less government support regarding resource 
access for their development. The Japanese firm, therefore, may find itselfplaying in 
an unfair game vis-a-vis its local state-owned companies. Although Hong Kong firms 
are regarded as part of Chinese ethnically firms and have offset the status of being 
"foreign" firms, they are usually segregated as “private enterprises" (Shan, 1991). 
Thus, while the inclusion of Hong Kong firms in Japanese-Hong Kong IJVs plays a 
very catalytic role in making the IJVs regionally competitive; the existing "home-
advantage" policy will be inevitably a major source of frustration and disgruntlement 
to devastate their growth opportunities and investment decision. 
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Deprived of the comparative advantages, few Japanese-Hong Kong IJVs have been 
able to diversify into large-scale operations. Typically, the greater policy constraint or 
"force" by local government, the lower the degree of drive to invest and the more 
likely foreign investors would shy away from making major investment. Under such 
situation, Japanese-Hong Kong IJVs may deem it desirable to get away of these 
radical policies by investing in metropolitan region such as Beijing, Shanghai and 
Tianjian where they can enjoy the highest level of autonomy and investment 
incentives, yet would receive little unfair treatments (Pan 1996). Needless to say, this 
investment decision will certainly put them in an advantageous position when 
competing with other rivals. Thus, we expected that the Japanese-Hong Kong IJVs in 
non-metropolitans should exhibit unstable or even poor performance than those 
located in metropolitan regions. This argument is tested in the following hypothesis: 
H3b: Japanese-Hong Kong IJVs would attain better 
performance in metropolitan regions than in non-metropolitan 
regions, 
A bulk of cheap labor and financial resources are concentrated in non-metropolitan 
regions, representing a tremendous market which has drawn the attention ofnumerous 
foreign companies (Hu & Oien, 1993; Shenkar, 1990). In order to obtain more profits 
from ajoint venture, many Japanese firms may aspirate to take part in investment in 
non-metropolitan regions. Nonetheless, non-metropolitan regions are also symbolized 
by Japanese investors as a serious of risk and uncertainties. It should be pointed out 
that the challenge to the Japanese firms is how to synchronize the investment 
opportunities in non-metropolitan regions and the risk associated in these regions. To 
survive in these regions, the firms should exploit firm specific-strategies in order to 
warrant the profits under the peculiar conditions. 
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It is valid to argue that the role of Hong Kong firms may not be functioned equally on 
the IJVs' performance in both metropolitan and non-metropolitan regions. As stated 
earlier, since Japanese firms will find them much easier to form cooperative 
arrangements with Chinese partners in metropolitan regions to cope with the risk that 
cannot be obtained without the partnership. Thus, in metropolitan regions, the role of 
Hong Kong firm as an "immediator" becomes less significant, and majority of 
Japanese firms may not have strong desire to form IJVs with Hong Kong partners. Li 
contrast, the Japanese firms may perceive greater cultural and environmental 
deviations in non-metropolitan areas (Hu & Chen, 1993; Pan, 1996). Some evidence 
suggests that Japanese and Chinese firms find it much difficult and undesirable to 
operate and deal with each other in a culturally deviated environment. This is because, 
in a culturally-deviated environment, JV partners insufficiently understand and 
support each other, and the conflicts among the partners are difficult to resolve (Hu & 
Chen, 1993; Li, 1994; Pan, 1996). Given the unfavorable investment conditions 
towards foreign investment in non-metropolitan regions, many Japanese firms may 
experience greater adjustment problems and display reluctance to invest in these 
regions. Obviously, Hong Kong firms' well-developed intermediary expertise, 
knowledge and connections with Chinese partners in non-metropolitan regions may 
act as desirable helpers for both Japanese and Chinese firms (Beamish, 1993; Pan & 
Tse, 1996; Shan, 1991). Since Japanese and Chinese partners have not developed 
proficient skill to cope with these problems, Hong Kong firms may serve as the 
intermediary link between both partners. In line with previous argument, the need for 
a Hong Kong partner in a Japanese-Chinese IJV is deemed necessary in these areas so 
as to mediate inter-partner conflicts and adjustment problems such as communication 
barriers and bargaining of each partner (Pan, 1996). More importantly, Hong Kong 
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firms' local knowledge and ethnic or cultural-ties to China may be crucial 
determinants for the Japanese firms' investment decisions in non-metropolitan 
provinces. We expect the role of Hong Kong firms in the Japanese-Chinese IJVs to be 
more critical for the success of the IJVs in non-metropolitan regions than in 
metropolitan regions. This argument leads to the following hypothesis: 
H3c: Japanese-Hong Kong-Chinese IJVs would attain better 
performance in non-metropolitan regions than in metropolitan 
regions 
Table 12 
Summary of the Hypotheses 
Number Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1 Japanese-Hong Kong IJVs are more likely to attain better 
performance than Japanese-Chinese IJVs. 
Hypothesis 2 Japanese-Hong Kong-Chinese IJVs attain better performance than 
Japanese-Chinese IJVs 
Hypothesis 3a Japanese-Chinese IJVs would attain better performance in 
metropolitan regions than in non-metropolitan regions 
Hypothesis 3b Japanese-Hong Kong IJVs would attain better performance in 
metropolitan regions than in non-metropolitan regions 
Hypothesis 3c Japanese-Hong Kong-Chinese IJVs would attain better performance 
in non-metropolitan regions than in metropolitan regions 
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Table 13 
Different Economic Indicators of Various Chinese Provinces 
Region Population*^ GDP GDP per GDP in Foreign direct Population Regional area 
(ten thousand) capita 1994 Registration density*^ (10000 km^) 
Beijing 一 1251 1,394.89~ 11741 1084.03 9691 ^ 1.68 
Tianjian 一 942 920.11 一9804 7^ .14 8959 ~834 1.13 
Hubei ~~ 6437 2849.52 —4444 n%lA9 5368 —343 18.77 
Sh^ xi — 3077 一 1092.48 3569 853.77 1364 207 ” 15.63 
Neimenggu — 2284 832.88~ 3666 681.92 — 1074 19 —118.30 
Liaoning ~~ 4092 2793.37 —6847 2461.78 11284 280 14.59 
Iuin — 2592 ~ 1129.20 4372 936.78 2990 — 138 18.74 
Heilongjiang “ 3701 2014.53— 5465 1616.63 ~ 4388 81 45.46 
Shanghai ~ " 1415 2462.57 — 17774 1971.92 14487 —2246 0.63 
G^gs ~ 7066 5155.25 7319 4057.39 — 22950 689 10.26 
Zhejiang 一 43198 3524.79 一 8185 2^ 6.86 11237 —424 10.18 
XiH^ ui ~" 6013 —2003.58 3348 1488.47 — 2949 ~~ 431 13.96 
Fujian — 3237 2160.52 —6731 T^5.34 16527 267 12.14 
3i^ gxi — 4063 ~ 1205.11 2984 948.16 一 3016 243 16.69 
^ndong 一 8705 ~ 5002.34 5758 3872.18 17988 一 556 15.67 
Henan _ _ 9100 3002.74 ~"3313 ln4A3 4382 —545 16.70 
Hubei — 5772 2391.42 ~"4162 Ws.65 5758 ~310 18.59 
Hunan 一 6392 2795.70 —3445 1694.42 3263 ~302 21.18 
^ngdong _— 6868 5381.72 ~ 7939 4240.56 “ 59585 386 17.79 
Guangxi 一 4543 1606.15 一3555 Tl41.83 4876 193 23.60 
H^an 一 724 364.17 5076 330.95 8606 214 3.39 
Sichuan 一 11325 3534.00 一3136 1^7.88 5897 ~199 57 
^z o u — 3508 ~ 630.07 1809 521.17 997 199 17.6 
Wannam 3990 1206.68 3044 973.97 1286 ‘ 101 39.40 
Ti]^ t — 240 — 55.98 2352 45.84 51 2 122.84 
iK7nxi — 3514 ~ 1000.03 2859 816.58 1894 — 171 20.56 
Jianchia ~~ 2438 553.35 ~" 2298 ^.66 1037 54 45.40 
^ h a i — 481 ~ 165.31 3462 138.24 — 97 7 72.12 
Ningxia 一 513 169.75 —3337 T3J.97 361 99 5.18 
Xinjiang 一 1661 834.57 一 5069 ^.68 656 10 165.00 
Total 121.12 |58260.5 4754 |4754 233564 126 960.18 
Source: Mitsubishi Research Institute, "The China Information Handbook”, 1997. 
*i Population means the total number of people residing in a particular range of area 
accordingly 




This chapter discusses the methodology of the present study. The chapter covers the 
sample characteristics, measurement (variable operationalization) and data analysis. 
Sample 
The study is comprised of a large sample of IJVs formed by at least one Japanese firm 
in China. This study examines three hypothesized relationships between the 
performance of IJVs and the three subsidiary types of IJV as well as their 
geographical location (regional variables). The analysis is based on cross-sectional 
data from the Toyo Keizai database for the year of 1995 {Toyo Keizai, Kaigai 
Shinshusu Kigyo Soran of1997). 
The Database on Japanese Foreign Entries 
The main data source for this study is the Japanese Overseas Investment (Toyo Keizai, 
1997). This publication provides the information on the foreign affiliates of the 
Japanese firms listed in the major stock exchanges in Japan. The dataset is a very 
comprehensive one for Japanese subsidiaries in China. The Toyo Keizai collected 
corporate information on more than 11,000 Japanese subsidiaries in 1995. Nearly the 
whole population of Japanese foreign affiliates was covered (Hennart, 1991; 
Yamawaski, 1991)，though a few major companies (e.g. Honda, NEC) might have 
underreported information on the number of subsidiaries (Anderson & Noguchi， 
1995). The information collected by Toyo Keizai was comparable to what was 
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compiled in the Harvard Multinational Enterprise Project for US MNEs (Curhanm, 
Davidson&Suri, 1977). 
Toyo Keizai (1997) provided information on the date of subsidiary establishment, 
sales, equity capital, employment including (domestic and Japanese), profit, and the 
location across the world. The data were based on questionnaires sent to all Japanese 
companies listed in the Japanese stock exchanges as well as to some unlisted firms. 
The survey was also supplemented with press release, annual reports and telephone 
interviews. Toyo Keizai listed about 13,500 subsidiaries of 3,332 Japanese parents 
with 5 % or more equity ownership. From the original survey, the sample we selected 
for this study included: 
(1) All the industries ofIJVs forrned by at least one Japanese parent firm.i 
(2) IJVs located in China.^ 
(3) IJVs that were established on a greenfield basis.^ 
(4) IJVs that were formed either between Japanese and Hong Kong firms, between 
Japanese and Chinese firms, or between Japanese, Hong Kong, and Chinese firms. 
Based on the above criterion, 1,759 cases were available. Of the available cases, 315 
cases were with performance information. The balance represented IJVs that were 
active in 1995, but did not have performance information. The breakdown of the 
1 Although there is no consensus on a cut-off point that should be used to distinguish JV form a wholly-
owned subsidiary, the international business literature has used 95% as the cut-offpoint to differentiate 
a JV from a wholly-owned subsidiary. For example, major studies that have used the 95% cut-offpoint 
include Anderson and Gatignon (1986)，Franko (1971), Gomes-Casseres (1989)，Hennert (1991b)， 
Stopford and Wells (1972). Therefore, this study follows the above convention and use a 95% cut-off 
point to select the sample. 
China mean mainland China only, excluding Republic of China (Taiwan) and China Hong Kong in 
the data analysis. 
In this study, intemationaljoint venture formed as a result of either acquisition or capital participation 
were excluded in order to eliminate the possible confounding effects of acquisition and capital 
participation. 
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sample in terms of performance information is illustrated in Table 14. 
To examine the three hypotheses stated in an earlier section, the following variables 
are described below. 
Table 14 
Sample Breakdown in Term of Performance Information 
Sample Size and Performance Information Cases (%) 
Total samples ofthe Actives IJVs in 1995 I r a 
Samples with performance information 315 17.9 
Sample with no performance information 1444 82.1 
Total r r a 100.0 
Measurement 
Dependent Variable 
Performance was used as a dependent variable in the analysis. The performance 
information used in the present study was extracted from the Japanese Overseas 
Investment (Toyo Keizai, 1997). The IJV performance is defined as a IJVs' top 
Japanese manager's subjective assessment of its financial performance, using a three-
point scale measure，coded “1” for financial loss, ‘‘2，’ for break-even, and “3” for 
financial gain. While the categorical performance measure has limitation, there are 
merits in using this type of measure. First, many JVs do not disclose their 
performance data. Second, even when financial performance data are available, it is 
difficult to compare them when JVs operate in different industries and countries that 
have different accounting systems and customs. Third, while the measurement may 
rely on JV managers' assessment of their financial performance, it can still be a 
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comparable measurement (i.e., a loss is a loss, and a gain is a gain). Finally, and 
partly related to the third reason, the subjective assessment of financial performance 
may be a better proxy for performance (Geringer & Hebert, 1989) than the objective 
measure of financial profit, particularly when the parent firms adopt transfer pricing 
policies towards their foreign affiliates. Since the majority of the performance 
information are supplemented by the top Japanese management executives, we expect 
managers to report JV performance from a similar reference point. 
Independent Variables 
Subsidiary Type 
In this study, we split the Japanese subsidiaries invested in China into three categories 
IJVs formed by Japanese and Hong Kong partners, by Japanese and Chinese partners, 
and by Japanese, Hong Kong, and Chinese partners, based on the information 
provided by the Toyo Keizai 1997. A summary of the categories (mode of operation) 
is provided in Table 15. 
We measured the subsidiary type in term of mode of operation. First, we define the 
“Hong Kong partners" as those firms legally registered in Hong Kong with registered 
company licenses. "Japanese firms" are defined as those firms registered in Japan, 
while "Chinese firms" as firms registered in China. 
In addition, the definition of "Japanese-Hong Kong IJVs", "Japanese-Chinese IJVs" 
and "Japanese-Hong Kong-Chinese IJVs" are pursed as follow: 
(1) Japanese-Hong Kong IJVs - Any international joint venture is formed from the 
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alignment of one or more Japanese registered firm(s) with one or more in Hong 
Kong registered firm(s) in China. 
(2) Japanese-Chinese IJVs 一 Any international joint venture is formed from the 
alignment of one or more Japanese official registered firm(s) with one or more 
Chinese registered firm(s) in China. 
(3) Japanese-Hong Kong-Chinese IJVs - Any international joint venture is formed by 
the alignment of one or more Japanese official registered firm(s), one or more 
Hong Kong registered firm(s) and one or more Chinese registered firm(s) in 
China. 
Regional Variable 
There are a total of 18 regions in China excluding Hong Kong and Taiwan. The 
frequency of each type of IJV by region is presented in Table 16. Lti this study, 
metropolitan regions refer to Beijing, Guangdong, Shanghai or Tianjian. All others 
are regarded as non-metropolitan regions. 
Table 15 
Frequency for Subsidiaries Type 
Subsidiary type Frequency 
Japanese + Hong Kong IJVs 3 
Japanese + Chinese IJVs 2 ^ 
Japanese + Chinese + Hong Kong IJVs L8 
To examine locational effects, we created a dummy variable. The variable was coded 
with "one" when the IJV was located in large metropolitan regions such as Beijing, 
Guangdong Shanghai or Tianjian and “zero，，if they were located elsewhere. 
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Table 16 
Frequency of Japanese-formed IJVs by Region 
Regions Japanese- Japanese- Japanese- Total 
Hong Kong Chinese IJVs Hong Kong-
IJVs Chinese IJYs 
Beijing - 47 - “ 47 
Guangdong — 2 “ 28 7 “ 37 
Hunan - 3 - 3 
Henan - 2 1 3 
Liaoning - ^ 1 ^ 
Jilin - — 1 - 1 
Heilongjiang - 2 - 2 
Shanghai 1 64 7 “ 72 
Tianjin - — 18 - 18 
Jiangsu - 4] - 4J 
Zhejiang - H - H 
Fujian - 9 - 9 
Shandong — - ~~ 20 1 ^ 
Hainan - 2 - 2 
Sichuan - 4 1 5 
Shanxi - 1 - 1 
Hebei - 4 - 4 
Neimenggu - 2 - 2 
Unknown - 1 - 1 
Total 3 293 18 315 




We first examined whether the performance of the IJVs differs between subsidiary 
types for each region in China. Table 17 reports the results of Kruskal-Wallis one way 
ANOVA. Further analysis was conducted to examine possible significant difference 
between pair of IJV combination, using the Mann-Whitney test. To examine whether 
the performance of the IJVs differs between regions for each subsidiary type, we 
performed further tests by using one-way ANOVA and Mann-Whitney test and the 
results of the analysis are reported in Table 18. 
Table 17 
Result of Performance by Different Subsidiary Type: 
Results of Kruskal-Wallis one way ANOVA 
IJV types Ch i -~~P ip~ 
IJV performance Japanese- Japanese- Japanese- Square value 
Hong Kon Chinese Hong Kong-
IJV IJV Chinese IJV 
In all regions 
Performance 1.66 2 .53 1.94 14.82*** 0 .0006 
Groupcomparison:** 61.50 162.36 102 .92 
3 294 18 
G 2 > G 3 ; G 1 
In non-metropolitan 
region n.a. 2.49 2.00 2.16 0.14 
Performance n .a . 7 1 . 7 4 45.50 
Group comparison:** 1^7 4 
No two groups are significantly different 
In metropolitan region 
Performance 1-66 2.57 1.92 13.46** 0 .0012 
Group comparison:*^ 33 .83 91 .23 57 .14 
3 157 14 
G2>G3;G1 
• Gl=Japanese-Hong Kong IJVs; G2-Japanese-Chinese IJVs; G3=Japanese-Hong Kong-Chinese IJVs 
Note: Upper row: Average performance 
Middle row: Mean rank 




Hypothesis 1 expects that the Japanese-Hong Kong IJVs would attain better 
performance than the Japanese-Chinese IJVs. Hypothesis 2 expects that the Japanese-
Hong Kong-Chinese IJVs would attain better performance than the Japanese-Chinese 
IJVs. 
Table 18 
IJV Performance by Region and by Different Subsidiary Type: 
Results of Mann-Whitney Test 
Regions Z p-value 
IJV performance Metropolitan Non-
region Metropolitan 
Region 
All subsidiary type 
Performance 2.50 2.48 -0.53 0.59 
160,07 155.45 
m m 
Japanese-Hong Kong IJVs 




Performance 2.57 2.49 -1.14 0.25 
151.87 142.49 
lJ7 U7 
Japanese-Hong Kong-Chinese IJVs 
Performance 1.92 2.00 -1.69 0.86 
9.39 9.88 
\jA [4 
* No comparison was made due to small sample size. 
Note: Upper row: Average performance 
Middle row: Mean rank 
Lower row: Number of cases 
An examination of the means scores of IJV performance in Table 17 reveals some 
interesting patterns. The results of Kruskal-Wallis one way ANOVA of the IJVs in all 
regions suggests that there was a significant difference in performance among 
Japanese-Hong Kong IJVs, Japanese-Chinese IJVs and Japanese-Hong Kong-Chinese 
IJVs (Chi-square = 14.82; p<0.001). The results of Mann-Whitney test suggest the 
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Japanese-Hong Kong IJVs attained a significantly lower (mean performance 二 1.66; 
mean rank = 61.5) than both the Japanese-Chinese IJVs (mean performance 二 1.94; 
mean rank = 102.9) and Japanese-Chinese IJVs (mean performance = 2.53; mean 
rank = 162.3). The test revealed that there was no significant performance difference 
between Japanese-Hong Kong-Chinese IJVs and Japanese-Chinese IJVs in all regions. 
Second, the results suggest that the IJV performance in non-metropolitan regions 
reveal no difference between Japanese-Hong Kong IJVs, Japanese-Chinese IJVs and 
Japanese-Hong Kong-Chinese IJVs (Chi-square = 2.16; p<0.14). Additional analysis 
of Mann-Whitney test revealed that there was no significant difference in 
performance for each pair of IJVs. Finally, the Kruskal-Wallis one way ANOVA in 
metropolitan regions revealed a significant performance difference among Japanese-
Hong Kong IJVs, Japanese-Chinese IJVs, and Japanese-Hong Kong-Chinese UVs 
(Chi-square = 13.46, p<0.005). Further analysis ofMann-Whitney test indicated that 
the Japanese-Chinese IJVs attained a significantly higher performance (mean 
performance = 2.57; mean rank 二 91.2) than both Japanese-Hong Kong-Chinese IJVs 
(mean performance = 1.92; mean rank = 57.1) and Japanese-Hong Kong IJVs (mean 
performance = 1.66; mean rank = 33.8) in metropolitan regions. 
Hypothesis 3a expects that Japanese-Hong Kong-Chinese IJVs would attain better 
performance in metropolitan regions than in non-metropolitan regions. Hypothesis 3b 
expects that the Japanese-Hong Kong IJVs attain better performance in metropolitan 
regions than in non-metropolitan regions. Hypothesis 3c hypothesizes that Japanese-
Hong Kong-Chinese IJVs attain better performance in non-metropolitan regions than 
in metropolitan regions. To test these hypotheses, we compared the performance of 
these IJVs between metropolitan regions and non-metropolitan regions. Table 18 
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presents the results of Mann-Whitney test The results suggested that there were no 
significant differences in IJV performance between metropolitan regions and non-
metropolitan regions for all the IJV types. 
In short, the overall results reject our hypotheses that the role ofHong Kong partner 
as an intermediator between Japanese and Chinese partner is not as significant as 
commonly believed. 
Table 19 
Summary of the Hypotheses Testing 
Number Hypotheses Result 
Hypothesis 1 Japanese-Hong Kong IJVs are more likely to attain Rejected 
better performance than Japanese-Chinese IJVs. 
Hypothesis 2 Japanese-Hong Kong-Chinese IJVs attain better Rejected 
performance than Japanese-Chinese IJVs 
Hypothesis 3a Japanese-Chinese IJVs would attain better performance Rejected 
in metropolitan regions than in non-metropolitan regions 
Hypothesis 3b Japanese-Hong Kong IJVs would attain better Rejected 
performance in metropolitan regions than in non-
metropolitan regions 
Hypothesis 3c Japanese-Hong Kong-Chinese UVs would attain better Rejected 




FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
To our knowledge, this is the first large sample study investigating the contribution of 
Hong Kong firms towards the performance ofIJVs formed by Japanese and Chinese 
enterprises in China. This study specifically focuses on the role ofHong Kong firms 
on two dimensions - the type of subsidiary and the regional location-in improving the 
performance ofthe Japanese-Chinese IJVs in China. This study attempts to explain 
the followings research questions. First, whether Hong Kong firms can improve the 
performance of foreign-Chinese IJVs; and second, what will be the performance 
consequence of Japanese-Hong Kong-Chinese IJVs, Japanese-Hong Kong IJVs, and 
Japanese-Chinese IJVs in both metropolitan and non-metropolitan regions. The 
results ofthe analyses that rejected our hypotheses in the present study may be due to 
a variety of explanations that need to be discussed. In the following sections, we 
discuss the alternative explanations for the relationship between subsidiary types and 
IJV performance. To this end, we first review our hypotheses, and then discuss why 
Hong Kong partners do not contribute to improve IJV performance. 
Evaluation of the Hypotheses 
In the earlier, we suggest that Hong Kong partners make inter-partner diversity 
between the Japanese-Chinese partners small, while making only marginal 
contribution to bringing local knowledge to the IJVs. On the other hand, the presence 
of Chinese partners may boost the inter-partner diversity within the IJVs, yet makes 
significant contributions with regards to local access, or familiarity to local situations. 
On this basis, we hypothesized that IJVs formed with Hong Kong and Chinese 
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partners would attain the most superior performance by combining their 
complementary contribution. 
Interfirm diversity and Performance 
Previous studies on IJVs advocate that interfirm diversity is also a dominant factor in 
governing the performance of IJVs. Very often, the greater degree of asymmetries 
between Chinese and Japanese companies, the greater the failure to achieve good 
performances because ofthe emergence of conflict and tension between the partners 
during the managing of IJVs. Given the effect of the interfirm diversity, many 
Japanese firms tend to pair up with Hong Kong firms especially when the risk and 
uncertainty level in China is high (Beamish, 1993; Pan & Tse, 1996). However, it is 
found that the performance among Japanese-Chinese IJVs even surpasses the 
performance of both Japanese-Hong Kong IJVs and Japanese-Hong Kong-Chinese 
IJVs. Contrary to our expectation, our findings suggested that the presence of Hong 
Kong partners did not significantly contribute to performance of Japanese IJVs in 
China. The results suggest that the intermediary function of a Hong Kong firm is not 
as powerful as expected. Simply teaming up with a Hong Kong firm may not be a 
viable strategy to improve the performance ofIJVs in China. This challenges previous 
studies which maintain that partnership with Hong Kong firms is essential for the 
successful operation of foreign firms doing business in China (Beamish, 1993; Pan, 
1996; 1997; Pan & Tse, 1996; Shenkar, 1990). The utility value of Hong Kong 
partners may be regarded as redundant and may even impede the performance of IJVs 
in China. 
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Local Familiarity and Performance 
It had been argued that a firm's local familiarity would positively influence the 
performance ofitsjoint venture (Makino & Delios，1996). Li line with this argument, 
it is argued that the Chinese firm possesses munificent local knowledge such as 
government policies, the local economy and the culture of Chinese region vis-a-vis its 
Hong Kong partner (Beamish & Inkpen，1995). Chinese partners are the immediate 
sources of local knowledge. Knowledge of local situations may only be available to 
the Chinese firm; and may not be readily acquired by Hong Kong partners through the 
accumulation of experience or other acquisition channels. Examples of such 
knowledge are local firms' skill and capability to access to the local elite, its 
competence with respect to local market access, product quality, branding，market 
reputation etc. (Makino & Delios, 1996). 
These arguments suggest that local familiarity tends to account for IJV performance 
better than interpartner diversity. Now, we consider that there are two major factors 
for this trend. First factor is related to Japanese firms' past joint venture operational 
experience in China. It is argued that if the Japanese firms have no JV experience in 
China, the performance ofJVs is improved substantively through utilization ofthe JV 
partners which have munificent knowledge on Chinese markets (Makino & Delios, 
1996). Since the inception of the open-door policy in 1980s，many giant Japanese 
firms, such as Mitsubishi or Sanyo, have been actively committed to a wide range of 
business such as the assembly of electronics goods. Operating in China for many 
years, many Japanese firms have gained munificence local knowledge through 
accumulation of local experience and have been overcoming the disadvantages of 
being foreign firms. They have also built up good relations with their local partners 
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and make the necessary adjustments to accommodate the managerial practices oftheir 
partners. By forming a good partnership, the interfirm diversity between Japanese and 
Chinese partners has decreased and this in turn, has resulted in improved 
communication and tmst building which are necessary for attaining better 
performance. If this is the case, the role that Hong Kong partners can play to 
minimize the inter-partner diversity between Japanese and Chinese partners may not 
be important. Second factors involves the importance of Chinese partners' connection 
to local governments (Fang, 1998). Traditionally, the Chinese market is controlled by 
a few large state-owned companies which usually enjoy the unique benefit of special 
privileges from the government. A wide range of major industries is reserved for 
state-owned companies and there are numerous barriers to the entry of Hong Kong 
companies. The home electronics and appliances market are good examples. In 
addition, the financial resources of the country have been directed to support the 
growth of state-owned companies. This special privilege, when applied to joint 
venture establishment and operation, will contribute to JV performance. Importantly, 
state-owned Chinese enterprises have the authority to intervene with government 
policies and are able to provide incentives for foreign direct investment. They have 
the ability to exert political influence to restrict the competition from foreign 
competitors in China. 
On the contrary, Hong Kong firms receive few bank loans and cannot operate in many 
key pillar industries. Even in the industries where Hong Kong companies are allowed 
to enter, a large amount of capital is required to operate competitively. Due to the lack 
of financial support, Hong Kong companies are not able to raise the necessary amount 
of funds to compete with state-owned companies in China, resulting in a lower 
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performance. Under such circumstances, it is advantageous for companies to enter 
into partnerships with Chinese enterprises to expand their revenues and develop a 
strong market position. 
The summary of the revised relationship between subsidiary type and expected 
performance is presented in Table 20. In this table, we focus on the three aspects that 
may differentiate between three subsidiary types: interpartner diversity, local 
familiarity and government protection. 
As discussed earlier, we consider interpartner diversity is high for Japanese-Chinese 
IJV, medium for Japanese-Hong Kong-Chinese IJV, and low for Japanese-Hong Kong 
IJV. This is due to the fact that every dimension of cultural and economic gap is wider 
between Japan and China than between Japan and Hong Kong and between Hong 
Kong and China (see Table 5). Therefore, we assumed that the interpartner diversity 
in Japanese-Hong Kong IJVs is smaller than that in Japanese-Chinese IJVs. Moreover, 
it is assumed that the degree of the interpartner diversity in Japanese-Hong Kong IJVs 
is rated considerately lower than that in Japanese-Hong Kong-Chinese IJVs because 
Hong Kong firms may only partially resolve the interfirm diversity of Japanese-
Chinese IJVs. 
The virtue of local familiarity provided by Chinese enterprises is the source of 
locational advantage which may have a positive impact on the performance of IJVs, 
particularly for those IJVs formed by Japanese enterprises attempting to establish a 
strong market position in China. As mentioned earlier, Chinese enterprises 
undoubtedly have more munificent local familiarity than Hong Kong or Japanese 
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enterprises. It is argued therefore that Japanese-Chinese IJVs and Japanese-Hong 
Kong-Chinese IJVs have the greater local familiarity than Japanese-Hong Kong IJVs. 
Government protection is also a crucial factor to govern the performance of IJVs. It is 
argued that Chinese enterprises usually enjoy more special privileges exclusively from 
the local governments than Japanese and Hong Kong firms in China. These special 
privileges, when applied to joint venture operations, may propel a direct contribution 
to IJV performance. It is argued that Japanese-Chinese IJVs usually enjoy special 
privileges most because they are the most favorable forms of cooperative arrangement 
from a local government's perspective, followed by Japanese-Hong Kong-Chinese 
IJVs and Japanese-Hong Kong IJVs (Beamish, 1993). Japanese-Hong Kong IJVs 
enjoy less government support because of no local state-owned enterprise in the 
cooperative arrangement. 
Based on the above discussions, we rate each of the aspects for each subsidiary type, 
and posit that expected performance may reflect the sum of rating for these aspects. 
The expected performance in this revised model is generally consistent with the actual 
performance of the IJVs that we obtained in the analysis. 
Challenges to Hong Kong Firms as an Intermediator 
According to previous studies (Beamish & Wang, 1989; Pan & Tse, 1996; Shenkar, 
1990)，Hong Kong firms are regarded as being competitive internationally in terms of 
skills and capabilities. However, there is little evidence to support the theory that 
Hong Kong firms are able to improve the performance of foreign-Chinese IJVs. Our 
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results indicate the performance of Japanese-Chinese IJVs excels that of Japanese-
Hong Kong-Chinese IJVs. This contradicts the findings of previous studies which 
maintain that Hong Kong partners contribute to better economic performance of IJVs 
in China (Beamish & Wang, 1989; Pan & Tse, 1996). Rather, our findings suggest 
that the Hong Kong partners' presence may impede the overall performance of 
Japanese-Chinese IJVs. It is also questionable if Hong Kong firms will be able to 
sustain their intermediary function or be able to help Japanese-Chinese IJVs to 
achieve better results. 
Table 20 
Summary ofthe Discussion 
Factors Japanese- Japanese-Hong- Japanese-Hong 
Chinese IJVs Kong-Chinese Kong IJVs 
1^ 
Interpartner diversity High (-) Medium (+/-) Low (+) 
Local familiarity High (+) High (+) Low (-) 
Government protection High (+) Medium (+/-) Low (-) 
Performance expectation High (+) Medium (+/-) Low (-) 
A positive sign in the parenthesis indicates a positive effect on performance of 
IJVs 
A negative sign in the parenthesis indicates a negative effect the performance of 
IJVs 
Upon investigation, it is found that Hong Kong's intermediary function faces several 
potential challenges stemming from its economic makeup and political 
transformations that jeopardizes its future attractiveness and competitiveness as an 
ideal intermediary partner for foreign firms. Before examining these factors in detail, 
it is essential to look back of the past three economic slumps experienced in Hong 
Kong. Hong Kong's competitiveness tends to follow a U-shaped pattern: revitalizing 
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rapidly after each downturn. During the first economic slump in 1970s, Hong Kong 
survived because of its strong industrial foundation. The second slump during the 
1980s can be attributed to Hong Kong manufacturers being hard hit by higher costs in 
the global market. Fortunately, Hong Kong's competitiveness can be preserved 
because of the massive relocation of outward processing activities to China with the 
inception of China's open-door policy. The third economic slump of the 1990s is 
characterized by high costs. Unless cost increases are matched by similar increases in 
productivity, competitiveness will decline. Rough estimates of the productivity on 
different sectors of Hong Kong's economy also indicate that cost increases were 
higher than productivity gains during in the 1983 to 1993 period. Unlike the past U-
shape curves, in-depth analysis reveals that Hong Kong's intermediary 
competitiveness will follow more of a L-shape. This situation is expected to remain at 
the nadir for a long time. With the current Asian financial crisis, no one can predict 
when the economy can recover. 
Among the Far-East regions, Hong Kong can no longer retain its attractiveness as a 
center for local and overseas operation. In particular, Hong Kong faces competition 
from Singapore and Shanghai. Published statistical data also indicate a general slump 
in Hong Kong's intermediary position. Figures released by Census and Statistics 
Bureau showed that the value of export trade for 1998 was $1.34 trillion, down from 
$ 1.45 trillion in 1997. Domestic exports were the worst hit, down 10.9 % while the 
value of re-exports fell 6.9 % from 1997 (Hong Kong Trade Development Council, 
1999). Such figures indicate that a decline in Hong Kong's intermediary position and 
that recovery is still a long way off. 
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To account for the steep decline of Hong Kong's competitiveness, we examined the 
two principle elements that influence Hong Kong's competitiveness: (1) from the 
enviromental standpoints: other rivals pose more direct threats and challenges than 
even before; (2) from key competitive elements such as the cost incurred by Hong 
Kong companies in Hong Kong, the work-force development. 
It was a chaotic period during the evolution of the four dragons in the Asian region at 
1970s-1980s.i Since an open door policy was adopted in 1979, China has allowed 
more economic investments especially along the Southern Coast of Guangdong. 
Meanwhile, the four dragons concentrated on promoting more favourable policies to 
appeal to foreign direct investment. In face of rising production costs such as the 
increases in wages, land prices and rent in many developed countries, many global 
companies are more likely to diversify outwards processing activites toward the 
emerging economies. 
On this basis, Hong Kong firms can act as intermediaries to faciliate foreign 
investment in Asian regions, particularly in the region of Pearl River Delta where the 
quantity of foreign investment is relatively high. However, the rapid growth of other 
Asian regions is increasingly challenging to Hong Kong's intermediary position. 
Indeed, much of competition may be in the form of indirect or direct challenges. In 
many occasions, these regional competitors are trying to imitate Hong Kong's 
1 The Asian four dragons in this study refer to Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan. The 
transformation of four dragons have been undergone the same course of development i.e. transition 
predominantly from agriculture to light manufacturing, scientific, technological and services industries. 
A chronic shortage of labor and higher cost have driven many foreign companies, particularly those 
giant multinational companies in labor-intensive manufacturing area to those four dragons where the 
quality and quantity of foreign investment is high. 
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strengths. For instance, to match Hong Kong's service industries, Taiwan will end its 
prohibition on direct trade and travel to the PRC in an effort to promote the 
entrepreneurial drive to its service industry. Singapores and Shanghai are reducing 
government influence in their economy and giving multinational enterprises more 
autonomy. At the same time, there are some areas in which the competitors are 
comparable or even superior to that of Hong Kong. Singapore has a political stable 
government, effective legal system and excellent infrastructure which is comparable 
to Hong Kong's adminstrative system. Taiwan possesses high-tech technology 
development that is superior to that of Hong Kong. As such, Hong Kong is 
undoubtedly placed in a vulnerable position. Hong Kong's competitive edge over 
other potential competitors is becoming narrower. Singapore is progressively 
emerging as a world-class business city capable of competing with Hong Kong's 
intermediary position of serving China and the East Asian region. 
Another most important factor facing Hong Kong's overall competitiveness is that of 
costs rising. Fundamentally, this factor has proved to be a major important intergral 
of attracting and retaining entrepries. Many manufacturers are faced with the high 
cost of daily operatons such as port fees, rental prices, etc. Indeed, Hong Kong's 
residential and commerical rental costs are one of the most expensive in the world, 
roughly comparable to, if not higher than, the rents in Japan. Also, the cost of 
maintaining a professional and well-educated work-force has placed heavy burdens 
on companies doing business in Hong Kong. This has prompted the exodus of 
multinational companies, particularly for the smaller and medium-sized companies 
from Hong Kong to other regions in China such as Guangzhou. At the same time, 
while the costs have risen, the quality of many services delivered has nevertheless 
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remained persistently high. The extent to which Hong Kong's intermediary function 
is debatable, but in the long run, such undesirable factors certainly poses a strong 
reason to destabilization towards the territory's intermediary competitveness. 
The Short-sight of Hong Kong Manufacturers 
To maintain its function as an intermediary, Hong Kong firms must possess unqiue 
competencies so that foreign partners must depend on the intermediary organization 
to sustain their vital transactions such as overcoming trade barriers; otherwise, they 
cannot achieve a satisfactory performance. In the past, Hong Kong firms have 
commited a lot of effort to sustain their intermediary leadership position to facilitate 
foreign business transactions in China. This is particularly true for during the 1960s-
1980s where Hong Kong firms shifted from the entrepot trade to manufacturing 
industries (Lethbridge, 1984). Lured with low-cost advantages such as labor or land 
price, they also invested a lot on research and development technology to keep up 
with worldwide standard. At that time, Hong Kong firms were widely regarded as the 
most competitive in manufacturing industries among the other Asian countries. With 
the possession of such advantage, foreign investors could totally rely on Hong Kong's 
uniqueness to bridge the gap for business investments in the Asian region. Hong 
Kong thus established itself as the most important intermediary centers in the world. 
Unfortunately, Hong Kong is gradually lost its attractiveness as the dominant 
intermediator because of the short-sightness of Hong Kong enterprises. Generally, 
Hong Kong firms invested little in research and development. With the rising cost of 
operations in Hong Kong, many Hong Kong firms started their outward processing 
investments in the lower-cost regions of China, minimizing investments in R& D 
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field so as to be more profitable. This short-sighted attitude has jeopardized foreign 
perceptions on the Hong Kong's intermediary function between China and the west. 
So far, relatively few firms in Hong Kong have developed high technology products. 
A majority ofthe local Hong Kong firms do not invest as much on the research and 
development expenditures to promote the development and adoption of modem 
technology. From the viewpoint of foreign companies, whether Hong Kong firms can 
sustain their leadership position among Asian countries is an important factor to 
determine if Hong Kong firms to be regarded as optimal intermediary partners to 
improve their performance in the Japanese-Chinese IJVs. As Hong Kong firms are 
losing their position as leaders in manufacturing areas to those firms from other 
industrialized nations such as Taiwan or South Korea, their reputation as important 
intermediary partners is declining. Meanwhile, from the commerical standpoint, 
Chinese cities such as Shanghai not only regard Hong Kong as middleman to boost 
their economic development, but also as rivals. They are now likely to grant special 
privileges and even widen their policies on foreign direct investment policy such as 
concessions on the ownership position, a tariff-free policy to foreign partners even 
without the intervention of Hong Kong firms and allow foreign participation on a 
number of foreign-funded banks with RMB operations? This will motivate foreign 
investors to continue bypass Hong Kong partners in search of other Chinese 
entreprises directly to regain more favorable agreements. Direct cooperative 
arrangment with Chinese entreprises stand to gain greater advantages than those who 
have Hong Kong partners in the Japnese-Chinese IJVs. Furthermore, the changeover 
of sovereignty of Hong Kong from the British to the Chinese in 1997 suggests that 
2 China changes foreign investment policies to attract capital. Zhonghua Gongshang Shibao (China 
Business Times), September, 14, 1998. 
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there is now no significant difference between “Hong Kong" and "Chinese" firms 
after 1997, that is all are regarded as "Chinese" firms. Foreign investors are now 
given the previous privileges negotiated by Hong Kong firms believe that the reliance 
on Hong Kong partners to obtain farther special privileges from Chinese partners will 
be reduced substantially. 
Many foreign firms are working directly with Chinese enterprises and are enjoying 
satisfactory performances even without the participation of the Hong Kong partners. 
Undoubtedly, this will further heighten their peception of Hong Kong firm as a non-
productive agent. This will obviously have an adverse effect on Hong Kong's position 
as an effective intermediary between Chinese and Japanese firms. 
Although many Hong Kong firms have been distinctive in facilitating Japanese-
Chinese IJVs performance, in the long run, Hong Kong firms have lost their 
competitive advantage outside of manufacturing as well. This problem particularly 
lies in the area of insufficient manpower productivity. Hong Kong firms invest far 
less in training than other competitors such as Japan, Singapore and Taiwan (IMD, 
1995). Many Chinese entrepreneurial firms are not keen on investing in education and 
training. They often prefer to recruit tertiary-educated people with a few years' 
working experience than fresh university graduates. The problem of attracting high-
quality labor is a major potential challenge to Hong Kong's intermediary position. 
Hong Kong has lost its comparative advantage (relative to other developing countries) 
by being unable to address the problem ofHong Kong's labor shortage. 
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This study has also examined the contribution of Hong Kong firms to Japanese-
Chinese IJVs across metropolitian and non-metropolitian regions regions. With 
respect to hypothesis 3, it is argued that the presence of Hong Kong partners would 
contribute more in non-metropolitian regions than in the metropolitan regions. 
Contrary to expectations, the result reveals that the extent of the contribution of Hong 
Kong partners pose no significant difference in performance between non-
metropolitan regions and metropolitian regions. This suggests that Hong Kong's 
intermediary function does not significantly impact the performance of IJVs across 
the regions. Another possible reason for this resulty may lie in the local environment 
in China. Tablel3 indicates that Japanese investments are scattered across China but 
the majority of investments are concentrated on the Southern and Eastem coastal 
regions. This is much consistent with the Pan's study (1997) that Japanese firms 
prefer to have JV locations with the central or provincial government rather than by 
lower-level government agencies. Although the lower-level government agencies 
show enthusiastic and receptive attitudes and provide more preferential incentives to 
foreign direct investment, such as long-term tax holidays and reduction in custom 
tariffs (Davidson, 1987), other unfavourable conditions have proved detrimental to 
foreign direct investment in non-metropolitan regions.^ In fact, non-metropolitan 
regions are less economically developed and do not have the necessary human 
resources and infrastructure to support their business operations. From the foreign 
firm's perspective, although the setting up of IJVs in these regions may be highly 
profitable, it is also faces many uncertainties such as the lack of local information and 
3 China to widen doorway to foreign investment-But financial markets to stay closed. Jingi Cankao 
Bao (economic Information News), November, 17, 1998. 
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knowledge, and influence with other key authorities. The process of creating and 
managing an IJV is often frustrating and challenging in these areas. 
Why do Hong Kong partners not contribute significantly to Japanese-Chinese IJVs in 
the metropolitan regions? One possible explanation is related to the operational 
condition in the local environment. The metropolitan region is the prime location for 
foreign direct investment. Metropolitan governments play important roles in 
encouraging foreign investment by providing favorable policies and incentives for 
foreign direct investment.^ A good transportation network, management control, 
technological and other backup services and impeccable legal system are also 
available. Foreign enterprises are thus encouraged to make major investment in these 
areas. As more and more foreign firms congregate in the metropolitan regions，it 
increases intensive competition for the resources, such as labor and material supply. It 
will incur some unnecessary transaction costs in trade. Even when Hong Kong 
partners have to be involved, as in that situation, the persistent transactional cost will 
certainly jeopardize the performance of Japanese-Hong Kong-Chinese IJVs. 
The congregation of foreign firms in the metropolitan area offers a large choice of 
foreign partners for Chinese enterprises to enter into partnerships with. Under such 
circumstances, Chinese enterprises have reconsidered giving foreign firms not so 
much preferential treatment to attract foreign investment or undergo a series of 
meticulous partner matching process.^ They now have the advantage over their 
4 More opportunities for foreign companies in retail and distribution. Xinmin Wcinbao Qiinmin evening 
News), September, 7, 1998. 
5 China contemplates ending preferential treatment for foreign firras. Zhongguo Gaigo Bao (China 
Reform News), October, 27, 1998. 
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foreign partners, and may cut down on offering favorable incentives to foreign 
investors. The presence of Hong Kong partners will put additional strain on foreign 




This is the first study to examine the intermediary role of Hong Kong firms on the 
performance of different IJVs formed by Japanese and Chinese enterprises in China. 
Previous studies have provided limited insights on this issue. This study serves as an 
initial platform upon which subsequent studies can be built. The results of the study 
have several important implications for international business theories and practices. 
To this end, the thesis empirically tested the impact of the two variables-subsidiary 
type and regional location—on the performance of IJVs. Contrary to our expectations, 
all the proposed hypotheses in this study were rejected. Specifically, the results 
suggested that performance of Japanese-Chinese IJVs were even better than those of 
Japanese-Hong Kong and Japanese-Hong Kong-Chinese IJVs. This questions the 
intermediary function of Hong Kong as a gateway to promote the commercialization 
of China trade and performance among the IJVs formed by Japanese and Chinese 
enterprises. In effect, Hong Kong firms' presence may even impede and pose a 
negative impact on the IJVs' performance. Although Hong Kong partners may still 
contribute positively to IJVs formed by Japanese-Chinese enterprises at present, it 
also faces a number of internal and external challenges stemming from its economic 
make-up and transformation to its present and future competitiveness and prosperity. 
On the regional level, the intermediary contribution of Hong Kong firms is not 
significant between non-metropolitan and metropolitan regions. This suggests that 
Hong Kong's intermediary function does not have a significant regional difference on 
the performance of Japanese-Chinese IJVs. One reason to account for the findings is 
the influence of the local government and market conditions on the performance of 
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the Japanese-Chinese IJVs. 
Overall, this result provides an important framework for the MNEs striving for 
superior performance in China. Foreign managers should realize that the alignment 
with Hong Kong partners in the Japanese and Chinese IJVs may not be a viable 
strategy to generate positive benefits, particularly for those IJVs located in non-
metropolitan regions. To rectify the misconception, the study provides new evidence 
that Hong Kong intermediary partners may be act only as a supplementary device in 
facilitating superior performance between Japanese-Chinese IJVs. 
Implications for the Hong Kong Enterprises 
One implication of the study is that a simple intermediary role to mediate culturally 
and socially distant IJV partners may not always contribute to improving IJV 
performance. Hong Kong firms should not simply rely on their intermediary role, but 
should actively identify and expand their own other distinctive competencies that 
directly contribute to the IJV performance. 
The durability of distinctive competencies can be arose from two following 
improvements. First, they should redevelop unique capabilities based on their existing 
unique capabilities such as close connections with China. Second, and more important, 
they should develop technology-based expertise to satisfy the needs of foreign 
investors and outperform local competitors. It is clear that the status and role of Hong 
Kong in such a circumstance created by timeliness, geographical advantages and 
positive human factors is very unique and may become more important in the 
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foreseeable future. In the coming years, no other place could duplicate these 
circumstances. Hong Kong firms can fully utilize this advantage in their Chinese 
business to improve their competitive position. 
To foster competitiveness, however, Hong Kong firms should orchestrate as much in 
the development and adoption of new technology so as to go ahead of competitors in 
the international market. 
Germany's manufacturing condition may be analogous to current Hong Kong 
situation during the period from 1986 to 1996. At that time, many Germany firms 
faced high level of price inflation. Thus, many Germany companies competing in 
global markets were unable to pass on these higher costs, and moved labor intensive 
production activities in lower-cost regions such as Hungary. Unlike the situation of 
Hong Kong, some firms have become the competitive leaders in the worldwide 
manufacturing markets because of sustainability of the advanced technology and 
creativity skill stemming from the past. A large number of top companies in Germany 
such as Siemens have devoted 10 percent of company resource to explore and support 
other research institutions/departments so as to exploit new product innovation and 
development. With the strong manufacturing expertise and implementation among the 
European regions, it has accelerated the commercialization of their scientific and 
technological research output, and strengthened Germany's competitiveness. 
At present, Hong Kong companies are more favored than German companies as they 
have a new frontier in China, which can yield unique economic benefit to Hong Kong 
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companies. Given the cost of building R & D skills, it is possible to conduct various 
forms of cooperation in science and technology so as to economize the cost. For 
instance, the Hong Kong Legend Computer Corporation is a typical example of 
transferring the scientific and technological achievements of the Mainland to Hong 
Kong fund. Gauging the lower cost opportunities such as labor wages, and lower rents 
as a result of financial crisis, thus reducing Hong Kong's high costs. In this way, 
Hong Kong companies must master the opportunities to redevelop its technology-
based expertise. If Hong Kong companies can develop entirely new products and 
charge similar price for similar products ahead of competitors, it can pose a strong 
position to compete with rivals, and Hong Kong firms can become attractive alliance 
partners both for Chinese and for foreign firms doing business in China. 
Implication for Theory Development 
Two applications for theory development and practices, and three suggestions for 
future research are suggested. First, although many researchers have tried to identify 
the factors associated with IJV performance (e.g. Pan, 1996), they have often 
neglected one important determinant i.e. tmst in the development of an amicable 
relationship between the IJV partners. The inclusion of the concept of tmst in the 
analysis will advance our understanding of how Japanese partners view trust in the 
IJV in various dimensions，such as ownership arrangement and responses to cultural 
difference. Future studies should directly examine the role of trust in improving the 
longevity and performance of IJVs. Second, because of the unique characteristics of 
market environments in China, foreign firms may not be able to predict the level of 
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investment risks especially in the non-metropolitan regions and remote provinces. 
Therefore, foreign firms need to form a JV with other firms which possess knowledge 
of the local market, politics and/or culture in these regions, particularly in the startup 
stage. It is argued that the success or failure of an IJV's in the startup period will 
influence its subsequent stability and performance. Therefore, it is worthwhile to 
examine the intermediary function of Hong Kong firms and its impact on IJV 
performance during the startup against the poststartup period (Beamish & Wang, 1989; 
Pan, 1996; 1997; Pan & TTse, 1996). 
The change in ownership during the course of cooperative arrangement is another 
intriguing issue to study. Makino and Delios (1996) argue that a JV's own experience 
is a primary factor influencing its performance. It is argued that asjoint venture's host 
experience increases, the relative performance of having a local joint venture partner 
will decrease. The elevated transaction cost stemming from partner opportunism will 
outweigh the local knowledge benefits of local partners. The presence of local 
partners may even obstruct the performance of JVs. A future study should investigate 
whether foreign firms can attain superior performance when they correctly align with 
Hong Kong firms during the setup period ofthe IJVs. 
Limitations 
There are some limitations to this study, which dictate that the preceding conclusion 
should be considered as preliminary and will need further research. In this study, we 
have outlined the differences in performance between the Japanese IJVs in China 
with Hong Kong parties (Japanese-Hong Kong-Chinese IJVs and Japanese-Hong 
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Kong IJVs) and those IJVs without Hong Kong parties (Japanese-Chinese IJVs). 
However, there may be various factors that may influence the performance of the 
IJVs, for example, foreign capital input or country risk of China (Pan, 1996). Future 
studies should incorporate other contingency factors in the analysis to enhance the 
explanatory and predictive power of the evidence found in this study. 
Another limitation of this study involves its cross-sectional research design. The 
study examined the data from 1997 only. It is better to include previous years of data 
in the analysis so as to examine the sequential trend of formation and performance of 
the Japanese-Chinese IJVs in China. This is especially important considering the 
recent political and economic instability in China. 
The study used the cases of the Japanese firms reported in the Toyo Keizai database. 
There might be many Japanese firms investing in China which are not reported in this 
database. Therefore, these results may not be representative of all Japanese firms 
investing in China. Also, we exclusively focused on Japanese firms investing in 
Mainland China and excluded Japanese firms investing in Hong Kong and Taiwan. 
Our results, therefore, may not be applicable to Japanese subsidiaries in Hong Kong 
and Taiwan. 
One of the crucial weakness of the thesis is the small sample size IJV venture 
involving Hong Kong partners i.e.，Japanese-Hong Kong-Chinese IJVs. Actually, 
there are less than 6 % of Japanese-Chinese-Hong Kong IJVs in the Toyo Keizai 
database, curtailing the credibility of the importance of a Hong Kong firms as being 
an intermediary partner in Japanese-Chinese IJVs. Non-parametric ANOVA was 
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therefore, used can be satisfied the underlying limitation of small sample size. Like 
other non-parametic test, it also poses some problems. Indeed, non-parametric test is 
less powerful and less precise statistical tool to indicate a statistically significant 
difference or relationship. 
Other limitations involve the scope of research. Although our data analysis is based 
on all industries in all provinces in China, it is hard to make a precise comparison of 
IJVs by industry and by province since different industries and provinces consist of 
different intra-system units and dimensions which may have different impact on the 
choice of ownership pattern and performance of IJVs. Moreover, the data published 
in the Toyo Keizai have some missing information such as profitability, percentage of 
Japanese partners, and the time of foundation. 
Clearly, the study should be positioned as the beginning of our understanding on the 
intermediary function of Hong Kong firms. The finding may serve as a research base 
for the study of the intermediary function of Hong Kong firms in trade between 
Chinese and Japanese firms. Future studies need to direct their attention to the 
intermediary role of Hong Kong firms - and should not be limited to Japanese-Chinese 
IJVs. As an extension of this line of research, it is interesting to investigate the effect 
of multi-partnership of different nationalities. By doing so, a more appealing 
implication will be obtained which may explain the utility and contribution of Hong 
Kong firms under the contemporary partnership arrangement. Another possibility is to 
investigate under what conditions Hong Kong partners contribute to the IJV 
performance across different industries in one province against another. For example, 
we note that Hong Kong firms have acquired much experience in certain services and 
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manufacturing industries such as hotel management and garment manufacturing. The 
analysis of the differences in performance of Japanese-Chinese IJVs across industries 
helps to investigate the relative role ofHong Kong firms by industry. 
Another interesting research area is to compare the intermediary function between 
Hong Kong firms and Taiwan firms. Taiwan firms also share some part of the 
intermediary function of Hong Kong firms. It is evident that Taiwan firms shared 
analogous economic, cultural and ancestral origins from the mainland China. They 
may become major intermediators for foreign firms which start business transactions 
in China but may focus on different role practices from Hong Kong firms. Chen 
(1994) argued that Taiwan's role in trade intermediation would be more concentrated 
than Hong Kong in the facets of utilization of domestic market information and 
channels and technology transfer. Future theoretical and empirical research need to 
identify and compare the intermediary function between Hong Kong firms and 
Taiwan firms which may be a means to demonstrate the specific intermediary roles of 
each firm. 
As explained earlier, the difference in national culture leads to the various managerial 
practices in the different nations. In our study, the focus is on Japanese firms. 
However, other nations may not reflect the same trend. For example, USA firms show 
individualistic values as compared with Japanese or Chinese firms (Hosfede, 1980; 
Ralston, Gustafson, Cheung & Terpstra, 1992). One notable example of illustrating 
the managerial difference by Pan (1997) is that Japanese firms favored relatively 
small amount of capital investment to the IJVs but US firms preferred to invest 
relatively large amount of capital investment to the IJVs in China. To understand 
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more fully on the differences in managerial value in various nations, future research 
should include at least two different home country samples, such as the Japanese and 
US firms, in order to ascertain the effect of Hong Kong partners for the firms of both 
nations. 
One intriguing area of research that needs to be investigated in future studies is to 
compare the intermediary roles of Hong Kong firms on IJVs with those of local 
Japanese-owned subsidiaries and local state-owned enterprises in China. Such 
comparisons must be made in order to identify the extent to which Hong Kong firms 
expedite the IJVs’ organizational arrangements and their bargaining power in relation 
to Japanese firms' own local subsidiaries and state-owned enterprises in China. 
Finally, from a transaction cost perspective, a JV is generally portrayed as a superior 
vehicle to minimizing transaction costs. Several studies have successfully applied the 
transaction cost theory to explain the foreign ownership preferences (e.g. Gatignon & 
Anderson, 1986; Hu & Chen, 1993). Even though the transaction cost approach can 
be used as a crucial theoretical framework, the theory cannot fully explain the 
complex issues of host settings such as the host country's legal, cultural and political 
influences on the IJV operations. Recognizing this problem, an institutional approach 
provides a useful framework to evaluate the extemal influence on the IJVs and 
counterweights the weakness of transaction cost approach. Future studies should 
incorporate both the institutional and transaction cost theories as an organizing 
framework to explain the existence of ownership pattern among IJVs. 
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